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In recent years, governments have become increasingly concerned about the
low levels of households wealth accumulation upon retirement, and the capacity of
individuals to keep the standard of living they had during their working lives. Among
the reasons behind these concerns are the high relative poverty rates among elderly
households, the low replacement rates provided by compulsory pension systems,
and the higher responsibility placed on individuals to fund their retirement due to
changes in pension systems and the increased complexity of financial instruments.
Government officials in various countries have developed a series of policies
that aim at encouraging retirement savings among the population. The evaluation
of the effectiveness of such policies has been a continuous objective of economists.
This dissertation contributes to the public economics literature in accomplishing
this objective via two cases whose analysis will hopefully inform policy makers and
help better design policies geared towards improving individuals’ retirement wealth
accumulation.
In chapter 2, I investigate the effect of the introduction of tax free retirement
accounts on the savings behavior of Mexican households. This chapter contributes
empirical evidence to the debate about whether preferential tax treatment is an
effective policy tool to encourage household savings. The empirical strategy is a
difference-in-difference approach that utilizes an arguably exogenous change in ac-
cess to tax free accounts for a well-defined set of workers. The data provide evidence
of heterogeneous effects across demographic subgroups and across quantiles of the
savings distribution that accord with predictions of a standard model of savings
behavior. In particular, the data show an increase in the savings rate of treated
workers in the year following the introduction of the accounts. The effect is driven
by prime age workers and by high income workers. Among prime age workers, the
lower savers experience the largest effects of the policy change. I perform multiple
robustness checks on these findings, including estimating propensity score matching
models and tests for potential confounding factors such as changes in retirement
accounts’ returns or fees, or changes in workers’ income.
In chapter 3, I analyze whether information framing related to the performance
of Pension Funds Administrators affects the retirement management decisions of
Mexican workers. I conduct a survey to collect information on recommendations for
Fund Administrator made by Mexican workers when faced with randomly framed
scenarios. The scenarios feature framing based on choice avoidance and framing
exploiting loss aversion. I find evidence that reducing the number of possible choices
increases the probability that individuals choose a Fund Administrator with a higher
net return or with lower fees. A “loss aversion” framing increases the probability
that individuals choose a Fund Administrator with a higher net returns. Finally, I
find evidence that higher levels of financial literacy decrease the effects of framing
on Fund Administrator choice.
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In recent years, governments have become increasingly concerned about the
low levels of households wealth accumulation upon retirement, and the capacity of
retired individuals to keep the standard of living they had during their working lives.
Among the reasons behind these concerns are the high relative poverty rates among
elderly households, the low replacement rates provided by compulsory pension sys-
tems, and the higher responsibility placed on individuals to fund their retirement
due to changes in pension systems and the increased complexity of financial instru-
ments.
In many countries, there is evidence that the elderly are over represented
among the poor population. Poverty rates are often used to measure how many
people achieve an adequate standard of living. The OECD defines this rate in
relative terms and considers an individual poor if her income is less than 50% the
median income in the population. Using this measure, the OECD (2011) finds that
the number of countries in which the elderly have higher poverty rates than the
population as a whole is twice the number of countries where it is not the case (see
figure 1.1).1
1Some recent poverty measures from the U.S. note that the elderly are the population group
with the lowest poverty rates. The disparity results from the definition of poverty as having an
income below a CPI adjusted income threshold defined by the US Census. I show here measures
of poverty as relative measure for purposes of international comparison (OECD [2009]).
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A second reason for concern that individuals may not be saving enough for
retirement is that they may overestimate the benefits they will receive from their
pension plans. Pension benefits are typically expressed in terms of the individuals’
perceived income while working (i.e. replacement rates). It is recognized that the
retirees’ population does not have the same income needs as the general population
and a suitable replacement rate is below 100%. For example, the National Retire-
ment Risk Index defines a target replacement rate between 65% and 85% (Munnell
et al. [2007]). However, the average replacement rate among the OECD members
is 57.3%. The compulsory pension systems in many countries will not provide a
replacement rate equal to the lower bound of the suggested target rate (see figure
1.2) and individuals will have to rely on personal saving in order to close the gap.
Table 1.1 shows evidence that households in a number of countries are not saving
enough for their retirement. Using the OECD average replacement rate as a bench-
mark, we see that the required contributions, as a percentage of income earnings,
that an individual needs to save throughout her career in order to reach this rate
exceed the recent savings rates estimates.2
The capacity of individuals to keep their standard of living upon retirement
also depends on how they handle the recent changes in pension systems and how
they invest in the increasingly intricate financial vehicles available today. Govern-
ments have shifted away from defined benefit towards defined contribution pension
systems to address the financial pressure that relatively older populations entail.3
2The required contributions column assumes that the individual will save every year of her
working life. If this is not the case the problem of low savings will be larger.
3There has also been an important shift to defined contribution plans among private employers
(see for example Poterba et al. [2001]).
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The design of a defined contribution system relies on a consistent accumulation of
contributions throughout the individual’s working life to provide sufficient support
upon retirement. Failure to save enough in a timely manner may lead to financial
stress in the late stages of the life cycle. Meanwhile, the increase in the availability
and sophistication of financial products for savings and credit imposes a high de-
gree of complexity to an individual’s consumption and savings decisions. There is
evidence that individuals tend to be affected by the frame under which information
is presented and to rely on rules of thumb to make choices that require costly cal-
culations. In turn, this behavior may put individuals at risk of making suboptimal
decisions in their use of financial products and lead to inadequate levels of savings,
overindebtedness, and unnecessary financial distress.
In view of this evidence, a list of policies have been developed to encourage
retirement savings. Some policies provide economic incentives through tax incentives
or matching rates on contributions to retirement accounts. Other policies promote
savings via the provision of information in fairs and workshops. The evaluation
of the effectiveness of such policies has been a continuous objective of economists.
This dissertation contributes to the public economics literature in accomplishing
this objective via two cases whose analysis will hopefully inform policy makers and
help better design policies geared towards improving individuals’ retirement wealth
accumulation.
First, I analyze the effectiveness of providing economic incentives in encour-
aging retirement savings. I study whether the provision of a preferential tax treat-
ment on voluntary contributions made to retirement accounts leads to higher levels
3
of households’ savings. In the second chapter, I conduct a field experiment to in-
vestigate the potential of non-standard economic models to explain the outcomes
observed in retirement management decisions of Mexican workers. These chapters
provide a rigorous evaluation of two types of interventions with features that could
be useful in informing the debate on how to provide incentives to help individuals
achieve higher retirement wealth.
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates the effect of the introduc-
tion of tax free retirement accounts on the savings behavior of Mexican households.
This chapter contributes empirical evidence to the debate about whether tax incen-
tives can be an effective policy tool to encourage household savings.
Over the past few decades, governments have attempted various measures to
increase household savings rates via targeted tax savings programs. In the US, for
example, Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans were introduced
in the 1980s. These accounts offer a preferential tax treatment on contributions
and on interest accrued from investments. The proliferation of such programs has
given rise to an active economics literature. Studies examining the U.S. and U.K.
contexts consistently present evidence of high levels of enrollment in tax deferred
savings accounts and of increasing balances in such savings over time. But, au-
thors disagree on the crucial question of whether these balances reflect increased
net savings. The major identification challenge facing this empirical literature is to
establish that any observed relative increase in savings among tax preferred account
holders relative to non-account-holders is not driven by differences in taste for sav-
ings. At the individual level, the decision to enroll in a retirement savings account
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is often considered endogenous to preferences for savings. A second important data
challenge is to establish that savings in such accounts reflect an increase in total or
net savings.
This chapter exploits the environment of a 2003 tax policy reform that af-
fected Mexican workers in the private sector to test the causal effect of preferential
tax treatment on households savings. The characteristics of this environment help
to address a key identification problem that has confronted many previous studies,
mostly in the U.S. context. First, savings accounts with preferential tax treatment
became available only for a sector of the worker population. Mexican private sec-
tor workers and public employees have historically contributed to different pension
systems. Because the 2003 reform only affected workers in the private sector, it
effectively created a quasi-experiment where private sector workers constitute the
“treatment” group. Second, I argue that it is reasonable to assume that a worker’s
decision of which sector to work for (public or private) is exogenous to their savings
preferences. This implies that the potential bias in the estimates from omitting a
control for saving preferences should be close to zero. Using several rounds of a na-
tionally representative household survey, I compare the change in the savings rate of
private sector workers to the change in the savings rate of public employees before
and after 2003. If public employees constitute a valid control group, this difference-
in-differences approach yields a valid estimate of the impact of the availability of
tax deferred savings accounts on the savings rate.
The analysis finds positive and statistically significant effects on the short
term relative savings rate of private sector workers in the year following the policy
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change. This estimated effect is driven by prime age and high income households.
Quantile regression estimates suggest that the effects of the policy change on the
savings rate of the prime age workers is concentrated among the lower half of the
savings distribution. The quantile regression results for the young and prime age
samples are consistent with a consumption/savings model where heterogeneity in
preferences translates into heterogeneous effects of the policy change.
I perform multiple validity and robustness checks on the estimated effects. I
present evidence to support the claim that public sector workers constitute a suitable
comparison group. In particular, their savings rate seems to follow a similar time
trend as private sector employees’ savings rate. Moreover, I perform propensity
score matching models to account for potential differences in the characteristics
of treatment and control groups. I find the results are robust to this estimation
method. Finally, I test for potential confounding factors and do not find evidence
that the estimated effects are caused by temporary changes in retirement accounts’
returns or fees, changes in savings not related to the retirement accounts, nor by
changes in workers’ income.
In the third chapter I focus on the determinants of retirement management
decisions. Retirement management decisions have been largely studied in the be-
havioral economics literature. There is significant evidence that inertia, hyperbolic
discounting, bounded rationality and self control problems can affect individuals’
levels of retirement savings or contribution rates in retirement accounts. In this
chapter, I investigate whether particular types of framing, based on menu effects
and loss aversion, can be causally related to retirement management decisions.
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I use the context of the Mexican Pension System to test whether framing
can positively affect workers’ retirement management decisions. Under the Mexican
pension system, workers are required to choose a Pension Fund Administrator to
manage their individual retirement account. Currently, the Mexican pension funds
market is highly concentrated and the Administrators with higher market shares do
not provide the highest net returns or charge the lowest fees. Despite the costless
nature of switching affiliation, workers switch very seldom and in many cases they
do not switch to an Administrator with lower fees. One potential explanation of
these outcomes is that the channels communicating the performance of Pension Fund
Administrators are ineffective at helping Mexican workers choose the Administrators
that maximize their retirement wealth.
I use data collected from a survey with an embedded experiment to test
whether providing information under a specific framing may lead workers to choose
an Administrator that is closer to an optimal choice. I ask surveyed workers to an-
alyze hypothetical cases containing information on the returns and fees of Mexican
Pension Fund Administrators. The cases feature randomly assigned frames based
on the concepts of choice avoidance and loss aversion. Choice avoidance relates to
the lack of choice observed in individuals when they face overwhelming amounts
of information. When processing the information becomes too costly, it triggers
inaction on the part of the decision maker. Loss aversion describes how individu-
als experience a disutility of larger magnitude following a perceived loss than the
increase in utility following a perceived gain of the same amount. These two types
of frames are cross-randomized across individuals. The randomization helps to pro-
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vide causal estimates of the effect of two concepts from behavioral economics on
retirement decisions.
I find evidence that reducing the number of possible choices increases the
probability that individuals choose a Fund Administrator with a higher net return
or lower fees. The “loss aversion” framing affects only the probability of choosing an
AFORE with higher net returns. I also find evidence that higher levels of financial
literacy decrease the effects of framing on Fund Administrator choice.
8
Figure 1.1: Old age and general population poverty rates
Notes: Poverty rates are based on the percentage of the population with incomes below 50%
of the country median income. Source: OECD (2011).
Figure 1.2: Replacement rates from compulsory pension systems for average earner
Source: OECD (2011).
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Table 1.1: Required contributions to close replacement rate gap
Country Required contribution1 Savings rate2
Ireland 7.35% 5.4%
United Kingdom 5.92% -4.4%
Japan 6.32% 3.6%
New Zealand 4.95% -14.8%







1 Required savings as a percentage of income earnings to close the gap between current pension system replacement
rate and the OECD average replacement rate. Source: OECD (2011) 2 Sources: Australia (2006), Canada, Korea,
USA, United Kingdom (average 2007-2008), Japan, Norway (2007) http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2011/tables/11s1362.pdf; Estonia (2007) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-09-029/
EN/KS-SF-09-029-EN.PDF; Ireland (average 2007-2009) http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2010/1029/




Pension Reforms and the Incentives to Save: Lessons from Mexico
2.1 Introduction
The issue of low household savings rates and insufficient household retirement
wealth is a major policy concern in many countries. Over the past few decades,
governments have attempted various measures to increase household savings rates.
Targeted tax savings programs are among the most common such measures.1 In
the US, for example, Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans were
introduced in the 1980s. In the United Kingdom, Personal Equity Plans and Tax
Exempt Saving Accounts have been offered for over two decades. These accounts
offer a preferential tax treatment on contributions and on interest accrued from
investments. The proliferation of such programs has given rise to an active economics
literature. But after more than two decades of research on the topic, economists
still disagree as to whether targeted tax savings programs increase net savings at
the household level. This chapter contributes to this active debate by examining
the impact of a 2003 law in Mexico that introduced preferential tax treatment of
retirement savings for a well-defined set of workers. The nature of the 2003 policy
reform offers a compelling quasi-experiment to test the causal effect of preferential
1Other schemes designed to increase retirement savings include default enrollment programs
(Choi et al. [2003], Carroll et al. [2009]), future enrollment (Thaler and Benartzi (2004]) and
matching rates (Papke [1995], Papke and Poterba [1995], Beshears et al. [2007]).
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tax treatment on household savings. This chapter therefore surmounts the primary
identification issue confronting previous empirical studies on the question.
As is well-recognized among economists, a standard economic framework pre-
dicts ambiguous effects of tax-deferred accounts on savings. The preferential tax
treatment raises the after-tax return on pensions relative to other savings. This
creates income effects that would theoretically reduce savings and substitution ef-
fects that would theoretically raise savings.2 The effectiveness of such programs at
raising household savings is thus an empirical question, and the empirical evidence
on the effectiveness of tax preferred accounts is mixed.
Studies examining the U.S. and U.K. contexts consistently present evidence of
high levels of enrollment in tax deferred savings accounts and of increasing balances
in such savings over time. But authors disagree on the crucial question of whether
these balances reflect increased net savings. The major identification challenge fac-
ing this empirical literature is to establish that any observed relative increase in
savings among tax preferred account holders relative to non-account-holders is not
driven by differences in taste for savings. At the individual level, the decision to
enroll in a retirement savings account is often considered endogenous to preferences
for savings. In the U.S. and in the U.K., each worker decides whether to have a tax
deferred savings account.3 Thus, if workers with higher tastes for savings are also
more likely to enroll in such accounts, the estimates of the effect of tax deferred
2A third wealth effect may also be created if individuals use the return to discount their stream
of future income. Future income in terms of current consumption is reduced and savings are raised
(Summers [1981]).
3In the US workers can choose to have a retirement savings account such as the 401(k) only
if their employer offers one. The decision to work for an employer who offers a 401(k) plan can
arguably be endogenous to savings preferences as well (Engen et al. [1996]).
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savings accounts on savings will be biased upward. A second important challenge is
to establish that savings in such accounts reflect an increase in total or net savings.
This is a critique to studies that focus exclusively on retirement account balances
and do not use comprehensive measures of household wealth. Studies using differ-
ent datasets, methodologies or making different assumptions about the exogeneity
of enrolling in a tax-deferred account find opposing conclusions on the effectiveness
of these accounts in increasing households’ savings. For example, Poterba, Venti
and Wise [1995, 1996, 2001] and Venti and Wise [1986, 1990, 1996] among others,
argue in favor of “new” savings; while others present evidence that the observed
contributions to such accounts represent shifts away from other types of savings,
including Gale and Scholz [1994], Engen et al. [1996], Gale [1998] and Attanasio et
al. [2004] among others. I review this literature below.
This chapter examines the introduction in 2003 of a tax law that affected
Mexican workers in the private sector. Mexico’s pension system switched from a
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system to one based on individual retirement accounts in
1997. The retirement accounts were comprised of a compulsory contribution made
by the employer and the employee, a state contribution, and voluntary contributions.
A few years after the reform, the Congress passed a tax law to provide workers with
incentives to increase savings in the private accounts. The tax law provided a tax-
free status to the voluntary contributions made to retirement savings accounts. The
law stipulated that beginning in January 2003, all voluntary contributions made
during any fiscal year to the individual retirement account would be tax deductible
at tax filing time of the following year. Furthermore, the funds and the returns
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earned on the investment could be withdrawn tax free upon retirement.
The environment of the 2003 policy reform provides a quasi-experiment to
test the causal effect of preferential tax treatment on household savings. First,
savings accounts with preferential tax treatment became available only for a sector
of the worker population. Mexican private sector workers and public employees have
historically contributed to different pension systems. Because the 2003 reform only
affected workers in the private sector, it effectively created a quasi-experiment where
private sector workers constitute the “treatment” group. Second, I argue that it is
reasonable to assume that a worker’s decision of which sector to work for (public or
private) is exogenous to their savings preferences. This implies that the potential
bias in the estimates from omitting a control for saving preferences should be close
to zero. Using several rounds of a nationally representative household survey, I
compare the change in the savings rate of private sector workers to the change
in the savings rate of public employees before and after 2003. If public employees
constitute a valid control group, this difference-in-differences approach yields a valid
estimate of the impact of the availability of tax deferred savings accounts on the
savings rate. This addresses a key identification problem that has confronted many
previous studies, mostly in the U.S. context.
The analysis finds positive and statistically significant effects on the short term
relative savings rate of private sector workers in the year following the policy change.
This estimated effect is driven by prime age and high income households. The
estimates on the difference of the conditional median of the savings rate distribution
between private sector workers and public employees in the year after the reform
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are between 4.9 and 9.3 percentage points for households whose head is 40 years old
or more. The estimate for all high income workers is around 8.3 percentage points,
whereas for prime age high income workers the estimate is 13.3 percentage points.
To put the magnitude of these effects in perspective, they are equivalent to between
one-half and one-third of the standard deviation of the savings rate distribution.
Quantile regression estimates suggest that the effects of the policy change on the
savings rate of prime age workers are concentrated among the lower half of the
savings distribution. The quantile regression results for the young and prime age
samples are consistent with a consumption/savings model where heterogeneity in
preferences translates into heterogeneous effects of the policy change.
The data do not indicate any permanent change in the savings rate. However,
the data also fail to show any subsequent drops in the saving rate among these
households. This evidence suggests that the temporary positive shock in the flow
of savings leads to a permanent increase in the level of wealth of prime age and
high income private sector workers following the 2003 policy change. A back of
the envelope calculation estimates this increase to be equal to approximately three
months worth of income in 2004.
I perform multiple validity and robustness checks on the estimated effects. I
present evidence to support the claim that public sector workers constitute a suitable
comparison group. In particular, their savings rate seems to follow a similar time
trend as private sector employees’ savings rate. Moreover, I perform propensity
score matching models to account for potential differences in the characteristics of
treatment and control groups. I find that the results are robust to this estimation
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method. Finally, I test for potential confounding factors and do not find evidence
that the estimated effects are caused by temporary changes in retirement accounts’
returns or fees, changes in savings not related to the retirement accounts, nor by
changes in workers’ income.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
Mexican pension system and the 2003 tax reform. To put this reform in context, this
section also includes a comparison between the tax treatment of Mexican Individual
Retirement Accounts and the IRA and Roth IRAs offered in the US. Section 2.3
reviews some of the previous literature on pension reforms and the effectiveness
of tax deferred savings accounts. Section 2.4 presents a simple theoretical model
of saving to motivate the empirical strategy explained in section 2.5. Section 2.6
presents the data. Section 2.7 presents the results. Section 2.8 presents a discussion
of the results and section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 The Mexican Pension System
2.2.1 A brief history
The Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) has historically been in charge
of providing health services and managing the pension accounts of all private sector
workers in Mexico. The IMSS is the largest retirement pension institution in Mexico,
providing pensions to 2.57 million people in 2008.4
4By comparison, the second largest institution providing pensions is the Social Security Institute
for the Workers of the State (ISSSTE). This institute provides pensions to retired public employees.
In 2008, the number of pensioners covered by ISSSTE was 290,000. (Presidencia de la República,
2009).
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The Mexican pension system was created in the mid 1940s as a PAYGO sys-
tem. The pension fund received contributions from employers and employees. The
contributions were a fixed percentage of the worker’s salary. To apply for pension
benefits, a person had to be at least 65 years old, currently working, and have con-
tributed for at least 500 weeks to the system. The worker’s pension amount was
calculated as a percentage of her average nominal wage in the last five years, plus a
fraction for each year of contribution in excess of ten years (Grandolini and Cerda
[1998]).
The pension system was designed to be supported by a relatively young pop-
ulation. In 1960, 55% of Mexico’s population was younger than 20 and 5.6% were
older than 60, and there were 4 pensioners per one hundred contributors. How-
ever, important changes in the demographic composition occurred in the following
decades. By 1994, there were 12.5 pensioners per one hundred contributors. Also in
that year, the expected annual rate of growth in the number of pensioners over the
next decade was 5.7%, whereas the most optimistic forecast for growth of contrib-
utors was 2.6% (Sales-Sarrapy et al. [1998]). These changes in the composition of
the population and poor management of pension funds pushed the pension system
into severe financial disequilibrium that threatened its viability.5 Between 1984 and
5The IMSS pension program started as a partially-funded scheme with contributions coming
from employees, employers and the state. For several years, the pension system reported a sur-
plus as a large number of young workers were contributing to the system whereas the number of
pensioners was relatively small. This surplus was to be invested by the IMSS and paid out as
future pensions of current workers. Instead, the surplus generated by the pension program was
often used to finance infrastructure requirements, to pay hospitals’ maintenance and operational
costs, and to finance health insurance provision and maternity insurance of the IMSS beneficiaries.
That is, the IMSS used the pension program surplus to cross subsidize large expenditures in areas
unrelated to the pension system. Other changes to the system rules increased the financial pressure
on the system. In 1989 pensions were indexed to changes in the minimum wage, and in 1995, the
minimum pension guaranteed by the government rose from 35% to 100% of the minimum wage
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1994, the IMSS’ pension expenditures rose by 150 percent as a percentage of GDP
(from 0.22% to 0.56%). According to the IMSS’ calculations in 1995, the pension
system would fall into deficit as early as 2003 (Sinha and Yañez [2008]).
2.2.2 The pension reform attempt in 1992
When the possibility of bankruptcy of the pension system was first recognized,
the Congress enacted the Retirement Savings Law (LSAR) in May 1992. This law
aimed to reform the pension system and lessen the burden on public finances. The
1992 LSAR mandated the creation of workers’ individual accounts that would com-
plement the contributions made to the IMSS through two channels. First, employers
were required to open a retirement savings account on behalf of their employees and
to deposit in them a new mandatory contribution. Second, employees had the
option to make voluntary contributions to their retirement savings account. To
promote such savings, the government guaranteed a 2% annual return on realized
contributions. Notwithstanding these changes, the 1992 reform had very impor-
tant shortcomings and did not meet its objectives: the majority of workers were
not aware of the LSAR or did not trust the system; the perception of the pension
scheme as just another payroll tax did not change; and the financial deficit of the
pension system did not decrease (Grandolini and Cerda [1998]).6
(Sales-Sarrapy et al. [1998]).
6Grandolini and Cerda (1998) identify the most important shortcomings of the 1992 LSAR.
First, there was significant lack of information among the population of employees regarding the
retirement savings accounts. Employers decided where to open their employees’ retirement ac-
counts. Thus, many employees ignored whether they already had an individual account or in
which bank it was held. Second, there was no regulatory framework for the retirement accounts.
The National Commission for the Retirement Saving System, which would later regulate the pen-
sion accounts, was created only in 1994, two years after the LSAR approval in Congress. In turn,
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2.2.3 The 1997 reform
After the failed 1992 LSAR reform, a new Retirement Savings Law was passed
in December 1995 and came into effect in September 1997. The Law introduced
two major changes into the pension system. First, the pension system changed from
being a defined benefits system to a defined contributions system. All retirement
contributions would now be accumulated in an individual retirement account, and
upon retirement, the worker would buy an annuity with the balance on her account.
Second, retirement contributions would no longer be managed by the IMSS, but by
specialized financial institutions.
Since the 1997 reform, the individual retirement accounts receive contributions
from three sources. The first source is a mandatory contribution made by the
employer and employee equivalent to a fixed percentage of the worker’s wage. The
second source is a government contribution called the “social quota”, equal to 5.5%
of the price-indexed minimum wage in Mexico City in 1997. Finally, voluntary
contributions can also be made to the Retirement Account. Table 2.1 presents a
summary of the major changes of the 1997 reform.
The new pension law set out the structure and powers of a regulatory commis-
sion (CONSAR). The law also provided guiding principles for the establishment, op-
eration and supervision of Pension Fund Administrators (AFOREs). Under the new
scheme, all workers were required to choose an AFORE to manage their retirement
there was no consistent supervision of accounts held by commercial banks. Finally, there was poor
account administration and collection by commercial banks. Banks had little incentives to admin-
ister LSAR pension accounts meticulously due to the low commissions charged and the relatively
small size of such accounts.
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account. Additionally, the AFOREs were required to provide their customers with
a bi-annual statement of contributions received, fees charged and returns earned.
The reform went into effect on September 1, 1997 and covered 11.5 million
private sector workers, including current workers, the newly reemployed, and those
entering the workforce for the first time.7 Workers contributing to the IMSS at
the time the law came into effect (the transition workers) would continue to con-
tribute to the pension system, but now their contributions would be deposited in
their individual retirement account. Transition workers were also entitled to receive
pension benefits under the regime of their choice. That is, upon retirement, they
could choose to receive their pension according to the rules of the old regime, or to
buy an annuity with the balance accumulated in their AFORE retirement account.
All workers entering the workforce for the first time in September 1997 and onwards
would receive benefits according to the new regime. The reform did not change
benefits received by current pensioners.
The 1997 reform transformed the pension system of individuals working in the
private sector only. Historically, public and private sector workers have contributed
to separate pension systems. The IMSS managed the pension system of private sec-
tor workers until 1997.8 The Social Security Institute for State Employees (ISSSTE)
has managed the pensions of public employees since 1925. No reforms to the ISSSTE
pension system occurred during this period.
7The reform covered almost 80 percent of the labor force in the formal sector (Edmonds [1996],
cited in Sales-Sarrapy et al. [1998]).
8Marrufo (2001) and Aguila (2005, 2008) analyze some of the implications of the 1997 reform.
See more on these studies below.
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2.2.4 The 2003 Tax Law
Following the 1997 reform, only a small share of private sector workers made
contributions beyond those mandated by law. This raised two concerns. First,
individuals could have been overestimating the pension they would attain from
their compulsory contributions. Second, because the reform stipulated a government
guaranteed minimum pension, the larger the number of workers with low balances
in their individual retirement accounts, the larger the number of pensioners who
would have to be supported by the government.9
To encourage savings in the private accounts, in 2002 the Congress passed a tax
law giving special treatment to voluntary contributions. The tax law provided tax
free status to the voluntary contributions made to the retirement accounts. The law
stipulated that beginning in January 2003, all voluntary contributions made during
any fiscal year to an individual retirement account would be tax deductible the
following year. That is, the amount contributed voluntarily to the pension account
could be deducted from the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) at tax filing time of the
following year. The total amount that could be deducted was capped, however.
The cap was set equal to ten percent of the individual’s AGI, or the yearly income
of an individual earning five times the minimum wage, whichever is less. Finally,
the law also allowed the contributions and the returns earned on investments to be
withdrawn tax free upon retirement.
The new tax breaks benefited all private sector workers, regardless of the
9This guaranteed pension is equal to one CPI-indexed minimum wage for all workers who do
not have enough funds to buy a similar annuity upon retirement.
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pension regime under which they choose to receive benefits. Voluntary contributions
made to the individual retirement account are managed by the AFOREs in a similar
manner as compulsory contributions. However, the AFOREs keep track of voluntary
contributions and the interest accrued on them using a specific sub-account. Upon
retirement, every worker receives a lump-sum payment equal to the balance on their
voluntary contribution sub-account. This one-time transfer to the worker is made
independently of whether the worker chooses to retire under the old or new pension
regime.
The 2003 Tax Break Law effectively turned the individual retirement accounts
in Mexico (MxIRA) into a vehicle that can be usefully compared to the Traditional
IRA and Roth IRA found in the United States.10 Consider a saver who plans to
withdraw assets for consumption in T years, when he reaches the minimum age to
claim pension benefits.11 Suppose that the net interest rate is r and the marginal
tax rate is τ . The value in T periods of one dollar of pre-tax income invested today
in a conventional savings account is
Vconventional = (1− τtoday)(1 + r(1− τworking))T (2.1)
If the dollar is invested in a tax deductible IRA, the value is
VIRA = (1− τretirement)(1 + r)T (2.2)
10This discussion of tax deferred savings accounts is based on Poterba et al. (1995). The tax
regimes for IRA and Roth IRA are described in IRS (2008a, 2008b).
11MxIRA funds can be withdrawn without penalty once the individual reaches 60. For IRA and
Roth IRA this threshold is 59 12 .
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If the dollar is invested in a Roth IRA, the value would be
VRothIRA = (1− τtoday)(1 + r)T (2.3)
Finally, if the dollar is invested in a MxIRA, the value is
VMxIRA = (1 + r)
T (2.4)
Ignoring the possibility of early withdrawals or changes in the tax code, equa-
tions (2.1) through (2.4) show how the MxIRA provides stronger incentives to save
than a conventional savings account, or a Traditional or Roth IRA. The ratio of the
MxIRA yield to any of the other accounts shows that the strength of these incentives
increases with the interest rate, the marginal tax rate, and the number of years the
funds are left in the account.12
Attanasio et al. (2004) provide another useful way to compare saving vehicles
based on the timing of the taxes. Resources put into financial instruments can
be taxed at three moments: income may be taxed before the individual has the
possibility to allocate it to some type of saving; returns may be taxed when they
accrue as capital gains or interest; and withdrawals from the assets can be taxed.
If we denote ‘T’ for Taxed and ‘E’ for Exempt, a traditional savings account can
be described as TTE, an IRA as EET, and the Roth IRA as TEE. The tax regime
for MxIRA can be defined as EEE. That is, the MxIRA is a tax-free account and
12See Venti and Wise (1990) for a comparison of saving vehicles in the US under continuous
compounding.
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not a tax-deferred saving account.13 The first stage is ‘Exempt’ because voluntary
contributions can be deducted at tax filing time. In addition, contributions and
interest accrued can be withdrawn tax-free upon retirement.
This chapter analyzes the impact of the availability of the MxIRA on the
savings of Mexican households. I now turn to a review of the existing literature on
the relationship between tax-deferred savings accounts and household savings.
2.3 Previous literature
2.3.1 Tax-deferred savings accounts in the United States
There exists a large literature in public economics about the effect of the
availability of tax-deferred savings accounts on the saving rate of households in
the US.14 The main question in this literature is whether the observed increases in
the accumulation of savings in accounts with preferential tax treatment reflect new
savings or a crowd out of other forms of private saving.
The debate over the effects of tax-deferred savings accounts in the United
States can be characterized by a series of papers by Poterba, Venti and Wise on the
one side and Engen, Gale and Scholz on the other side.15 The former authors tend
to argue that such accounts have increased overall household savings; the latter set
13A tax-free saving account was made available in Canada in the early 1980s. This account,
however, was targeted to increase savings intended for a home purchase (see Engelhardt [1996]).
14Here I mention only papers that analyze the relationship of tax-deferred savings accounts and
household savings. A related literature has developed the relationship between pension wealth and
savings (Gale [1998], Attanasio and Brugiavini [2003], Attanasio and Rowhedder [2003], Engelhardt
and Kumar [2007], Khitatrakun et. al [2001]) and the optimality of retirement wealth accumulation
(Hubbard et al. [1995], Scholz et al. [2006], Skinner [2007]).
15For a thorough review of this literature see Bernheim (2002).
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of authors tend to argue that the accumulation of wealth in such accounts represents
shifts from alternative sources of savings, and hence does not reflect new savings.
Poterba et al. (1995) analyze whether the introduction of 401(k) savings ac-
counts had an impact on personal savings of US households. The authors argue that
a key obstacle in determining the saving effect of 401(k)s is heterogeneity in tastes
for savings. If some people tend to save more than others, savers may be dispropor-
tionately represented among families with 401(k) accounts, and thus, a comparison
of assets between contributors and non-contributors will yield an upward biased
estimate of the saving effect of 401(k)s. Poterba et al. (1995) address this issue
in two ways. First, they argue that conditional on household income and other
demographic characteristics the probability of working at a firm offering a 401(k)
plan is exogenous and, moreover, independent of the household’s saving behavior.16
This implies that the saving effect of the plan can be obtained from comparing the
assets of eligible and non-eligible families. Using the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP 1987 and 1991), the authors show that the median of total as-
sets of eligible families is higher than for non-eligible families at each percentile of
household income. The second approach to address heterogeneity in saving tastes
divides individuals into ”like” saving groups based on 401(k) eligibility and IRA
contribution status and follows them across time. The authors find that individuals
who are “exposed” to 401(k) and IRAs for a longer period of time have more assets
and roughly the same level of non-401(k) assets than individuals with less exposure.
This finding is consistent with 401(k) savings not being a substitute for other assets.
16This assumption is found in the authors’ previous work (see for instance Venti and Wise [1986]).
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In a related paper, Venti and Wise (1996) compare younger and older cohorts
with different lengths of exposure to personal retirement saving programs. The
authors find that exposure to personal retirement saving plans adds substantially
to the personal financial assets of older families.
Engen, Gale and Scholz (EGS 1994, 1996, 1998) present evidence that previ-
ous authors’ estimates of the impact of retirement accounts on wealth are biased
upward due to the failure to correctly account for the heterogeneity in tastes, to
include the debt levels of contributors in the calculation of wealth, and to recognize
differences in the macroeconomic environment across time. Gale and Scholz (1994)
estimate saving equations by regressing the level of IRA and non-IRA financial sav-
ings on demographic factors and IRA contribution status. They find evidence that
households with IRA accounts have different savings functions than those without
an IRA account. The authors also find evidence of a positive relationship between
debt levels and IRA financial savings. Moreover, once mortgage debt is accounted
for as part of household wealth, IRA contributors had the same level of wealth as
non-contributors. In other words, since individuals are acquiring debt at the same
time they are contributing to the tax-deferred accounts, the net impact on savings
is null.17 Finally, Engen et al. (1996) note that the large difference in asset accu-
mulation between young and old cohorts in the 1990s can be mostly explained by
the boom in the stock market and the high real interest rates that young cohorts
experienced, and not by a change in household savings behavior.
17These results have been questioned by other authors, who argue that if a tax-deferred saving
account would displace other saving, it is more likely to reduce the accumulation of financial assets
than to encourage greater borrowing against homes (Bernheim [2002]).
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More recently, studies have allowed for heterogeneous impacts of the tax de-
ferred savings accounts on wealth accumulation. Engen and Gale (2000) show that
the assumption of exogeneity in 401(k) eligibility is less stringent if the impact on
savings is allowed to vary across earnings categories. The authors find that contri-
butions by low-income households are likely to be new savings, whereas contribu-
tions from higher income households are more likely to be shifts from other forms
of savings. Benjamin (2003) uses propensity score subclassification to account for
differences in 401(k) eligibility status, as opposed to relying on a comparison of
eligible versus ineligible households. Using the 1991 SIPP, he creates ten subclas-
sifications for households according to the probability of being 401(k) eligible. The
author estimates that about half of the 401(k) balances are new savings. He finds
evidence that households who typically save little are more responsive and 401(k)
eligibility increases their overall wealth, whereas households with higher taste for
savings fund their 401(k) with shifts from other saving vehicles. Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2004) analyze the effect of 401(k) participation on wealth using 1990 SIPP
data and Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression analysis.18 The authors use
the conditional exogeneity of 401(k) eligibility status to instrument 401(k) contri-
bution status and estimate the conditional quantile distribution of several measures
of wealth. They find suggestive evidence that 401(k) participation increased the
total wealth of households in the lower tails of the wealth distribution, but lead to
substitution from other forms of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution.
18This approach was first used by Abadie (2003). Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004) expand
Abadie’s approach by analyzing other points on the wealth distribution besides the median and
the mean.
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A consensus view of the effect of tax-preferred savings accounts on household
savings has not been reached as studies using alternative data sources have contested
previous evidence. Attanasio et al. (2004) analyze the impact on savings rates of
tax deferred accounts in the US and in the UK. For the US case, they argue that
if IRA contributions represent new savings, an individual who begins contributing
to an IRA must experience a negative change in her consumption pattern. The
authors use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the 1982-1986 period and
do not find statistically significant changes in the consumption of new IRA contrib-
utors.19 For the UK case, the authors use the British Panel Study for 1991-2001
to analyze whether there has been a change in the average saving rate after the
introduction of the Individual Saving Accounts (ISA). They do not find any evi-
dence of this. Pence (2006) estimates the effect of 401(k) eligibility on savings using
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The author attempts to overcome a prob-
lem faced by previous studies that focus on the effect of 401(k) on the percentage
change in wealth. She notes that a log transformation leads to the dropping of many
observations with non-positive values of wealth and proposes an alternative trans-
formation. Applying the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to several wealth
measures allows the inclusion of observations with non-positive values of wealth in
the econometric estimation. She does not find conclusive evidence of the effect of
401(k) eligibility on savings.20
19This approach has been criticized since consumption growth rates have been found to be poor
indicators of savings (Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg [2001], cited in Bernheim [2002]).
20In unpublished work Pence (2001) addresses the heterogeneity in tastes for savings by including
subjective measures of savings tastes as controls in her estimations. The results suggest that 401(k)s
have little to no effect on savings.
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2.3.2 Pension reforms and savings in the Latin American context
For Latin American countries, previous studies have only analyzed the effect on
household savings when pension systems switched from PAYGO to a system based
on Individual Accounts. Coronado (2002) investigates the Chilean pension reform
of 1981. The reform created a new pension system based on defined contributions
that became optional to all Chilean workers. The author’s identification strategy
is motivated by two facts. First, the majority of household heads under 40 years
old contributed to the new system, whereas the majority of older heads decided
to keep contributing to the old one. Second, the pension system in Chile covers
salaried workers while the self employed have historically been excluded. These two
facts create four mutually exclusive groups from which a difference-in-differences
estimator can be obtained. Using a nationally representative expenditure survey, the
author finds that the reform provided a stimulus for net-of-social security household
saving, increasing household saving rates between 5 and 10 percentage points.21
Several studies have analyzed the 1997 pension reform in Mexico, but they
have mostly been descriptive (Edmonds [1996], Rodŕıguez [1999], and Sales-Sarrapy
et al. [1998]). A few exceptions are notable. Marrufo (2001) analyzes the pension
system reform and its effects on wages. In a study more related to the present
analysis, Aguila (2008) studies the impact of the 1997 reform on households’ savings
using a Life Cycle Hypothesis framework. Her analysis closely follows Attanasio and
21The effect of the Chilean pension reform (and subsequent regulations) on other outcomes
such as contribution rates, contribution patterns, and choice of Administrator of Pension Funds
have been studied in the literature as well. See for example Mitchell et al. (2007), Todd and
Vélez-Grajales (2008) and Krasnokutskaya et al. (2008).
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Rohwedder (2003), who analyze pension reforms in the UK. The author finds that
the reform led to an increase of pension wealth for private sector individuals who
earn up to five times the minimum wage. Using two way propensity score matching,
she finds evidence of a crowd-out effect on households who experienced a change
in pension wealth.22 The estimates show a significant positive change in household
consumption and a marginally significant negative impact on household savings. In
line with the predictions of the Life Cycle Hypothesis, the author finds stronger
(marginally significant) effects for older cohorts, defined as having a household head
above age 40. She interprets this result as evidence that the older a person is,
the closer a substitute pension wealth is for other types of savings. One potential
concern about the author’s estimation is that the majority of private sector workers
did not have an individual retirement account until July of 2001, the deadline set
by law for workers to choose an AFORE. The number of workers contributing to
the new system in 1998 was around 880,000, less than 2% of the Economically
Active Population (EAP). Thus, the author’s preferred interpretation requires the
assumption that even though the workers did not take the effort and time to choose
an AFORE, they understood the changes implied by the reform and changed their
consumption-savings behavior in anticipation of future participation. By way of
comparison, the policy change analyzed here occurred in 2003. The number of
workers contributing to the new system in that year was 12.6 million, 30% of the
EAP (Sinha and Yañez [2008]).
22I apply two way propensity score matching to test the robustness of my results (see section
2.7). A detailed description of this methodology is found in Dearden et al. (2001) and Blundell et
al. (2004).
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To my knowledge, this is the first study analyzing the impact of a preferential
tax treatment within a defined contribution pension system. I use Mexico’s 2003
law providing tax breaks to voluntary contributions. This chapter is intended to
contribute to the literature on the impact on households savings of tax-deferred
saving accounts in a setting different from the US. The identification strategy in
this paper relies on the sudden availability of savings accounts with preferential tax
treatment and the differential access to these accounts for private and public sector
workers. These unique features help overcome the identification issues that have
been noted in previous studies in the US context. I continue by describing a simple
theoretical model of the effects of tax-deferred accounts on savings.
2.4 A simple theoretical framework
I describe a simple theoretical model to illustrate how a change in the rate of
return leads to heterogeneous (yet ambiguously signed) effects on the savings rate of
an individual. Also, I explore some of the model’s implications that help motivate
the empirical strategy in the next section. The model presented below is based on
Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and Attanasio
et al. (2004). Assume that an individual lives for three periods: young, prime age
and retirement. She works in the first two and retires in the third. The individual
makes consumption and saving decisions to maximize her lifetime discounted utility.
For simplicity, the utility function exhibits Constant Elasticity of Substitution. The
individual chooses her consumption (savings) level in periods 1 and 2. Savings
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accrue at an exogenous net interest rate of r. In the third period the individual
receives retirement benefits b and consumes all her savings. There are no bequests.

















c1 = y1(1− τ1)− s1 (2.6)
c2 = y2(1− τ2)− s2 + (1 + r)s1 (2.7)
c3 = b+ (1 + r)s2 (2.8)
where yi represent earnings in periods 1 and 2, τi is the marginal tax rate in periods
1 and 2, β is the time discount factor, and 1/γ is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. The solution to this problem yields the following savings rate in periods
1 and 2:
SR1 = 1− 1
(1 + δ + δ2)y1(1− τ1)
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where PDV I is the present discounted value of the individual’s income.23 Note that
at time 2, the individual’s accumulated assets are fixed: A1 = (1 + r) ∗ s1.
A few notable results follow from equations (2.11) and (2.12). First, a change
in r may differentially affect individuals living in period 1 (young workers) and
those living in period 2 (prime age workers). Second, the effect of a change in
the net interest rate r depends on the interaction of the time discount factor, the
individual’s income and the intertemporal substitution elasticity (1/γ). Third, the
heterogeneity in tastes for savings leads to heterogeneous effects after a change in
r and provides some guidance for the expected pattern of such effects. To see this
23The discounted lifetime income of the individual is PDV I = y1(1− τ1) + y2(1−τ2)(1+r) + b(1+r)2 .
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consider the following examples.24 Take two individuals who solve the maximization
problem described above. One has an intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/γ)
greater than 1. The other has preferences such that 1/γ = 1 (i.e. Cobb Douglas
preferences). For the second individual the optimal savings rate while young is
SRCobb = 1− 1
(1 + β + β2)y1(1− τ1)
[





















Equations (2.9) and (2.13) show how, all else equal, higher levels of 1/γ lead
to higher savings rates. Moreover, equations (2.11) and (2.14) show how individuals
with higher tastes for savings (as reflected in a higher savings rate) could experience
a larger effect following a change in r. These conclusions hold as well if we compare
an individual with 1/γ > 1 to an individual with 1/γ < 1.
Heterogeneity in tastes for savings can also translate into heterogenous effects
for the case of prime age workers. Individuals with higher tastes for savings will
arrive with higher levels of assets (A1) into period 2. Thus, we can characterize how
the effect of a change in r on savings will vary at different levels of accumulated
24Heterogeneity in preferences for savings has been modeled in other ways before. For example,
Zeldes (1989) includes a family tastes parameter in the utility function that shifts preferences for
consumption. Alternatively, Mankiw (2000) assumes there are two types of individuals in the
society: those who save some part of their income and those who spend all their income. For ease
of presentation, here I follow Bernheim (2002) and show the implications of different levels of 1/γ
on the savings rate. I also show some implications of different levels of accumulated assets.
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Equation (2.15) shows that higher tastes for savings, reflected in higher ac-
cumulated assets from period 1, lead to decreasing (increasing) positive (negative)
effects of a change in r on the savings rate. That is, if the effect of the introduction
of the tax-deferred savings accounts is positive for prime age workers, those with
higher tastes for savings will respond less than those with lower tastes for savings.25
The model presented in equations (2.5) - (2.10) is a simplified version of reality.
There are no changes to pension wealth, no uncertainty and no bequests. Although
these margins could affect the savings decision of the individual, concerns arising
from these simplifications could be lessened by the following facts. First, this chapter
analyzes a period in which no changes other than the 2003 tax law were made to
the pension system. Second, there is no reason to believe that uncertainty (about
income or health expenditures) would change differentially between private and
25It could be argued that the level of A1 could differ across two individuals as a result only of
differences in the timing they receive their income and not because of different taste for savings.
Here, however, I assume that the stream of income is the same but other exogenous factors related
to tastes for savings affect the accumulation of savings. In Section 2.7, I empirically estimate
heterogenous effects of the policy at different points of the conditional savings distribution. I do
this as a proxy for an analysis based on heterogeneity in tastes for savings. As a specification
check, I test whether controlling for income affects the results. The estimates are qualitatively
similar when income is included as a regressor.
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public sector workers in the period analyzed. Only the private sector workers were
affected by the tax break law whereas public employees continued contributing to a
different pension system.
The objective of the model described above is to illustrate the theoretical am-
biguity and probable heterogeneous effects on savings of the introduction of the
Mexican Individual Retirement Accounts. To be clear, I do not propose that the
model above is unique at defining the consumption/savings decision nor do I seek to
estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution or any other structural parame-
ter. Instead, I use the model’s general implications on the potential for heterogenous
responses along various dimensions as a guide for the empirical work that follows.
I empirically allow for heterogeneous policy effects across subgroups of the workers’
population based on income, marginal tax rate, age, and taste for savings. I describe
in more detail the empirical strategy in the next section.
2.5 Empirical approach
To estimate the effect of the tax break law on household savings I use a dif-
ference in differences (DID) approach.26 The standard model for the DID design
is the following. Individual i belongs to group Gi ∈ {0, 1}, where group 1 is the
“treatment” group experiencing an intervention. Also, individual i is observed in
time period Ti ∈ {0, 1}, where period 1 refers to the post-policy period. Letting
the outcome of interest be Yi, the observed data are the triple (Yi, Gi, Ti). Rubin
26The description of the standard difference-in-differences model follows the presentation in
Athey and Imbens (2006).
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(1974, 1978) defined the potential outcome notation found in the treatment effect
literature: let Y Ni denote the outcome of individual i in the absence of treatment,
and Y Ii the outcome for the same individual if the treatment is received. Thus, if Ii
is an indicator of treatment, the observed outcome for individual i is
Yi = Y
N
i · (1− Ii) + Ii · Y Ii (2.16)
where in a two-group-two-period setting Ii = Gi · Ti. Finally, the model for the
realized outcome is
Yi = α + δ · Ti + β ·Gi + τ · Ii + εi (2.17)
where δ represents a time effect, β is a group-specific time invariant effect, and τ is
the DID estimator.
The outcome of interest is household i ’s savings rate (Savingsi) and the treat-
ment group consists of private sector households (privatesec). The “control” group
is comprised of households whose head is a public employee. Recall that this group
was not assigned individual retirement accounts in 1997 nor were they affected by
the 2003 tax break law. Public sector employees’ pension system switched to private
retirement accounts in 2007.
The tax break policy change became effective in 2003. The pre and post policy
periods can be represented by the years 2002 and 2004, respectively.27 As is common
27Ideally, the year 2003 would be included as the post-policy period. Unfortunately there are no
data available for this year. See more details about the data in Section 2.6.
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in the treatment effect literature, I extend the standard DID model to include a set
of economic and demographic characteristics to control for other factors that may
affect saving and cloud the estimate of the effect of the policy. In this extended DID
model, the equation to be estimated is the following:
Savingsit =α + δ · T (2004)it + β ·G(privatesec)it + τ · I(2004 · privatesec)it
+X ′itγ + νit
(2.18)
where t = {2002, 2004} and τ is the DID coefficient.28 If the policy change increased
saving, τ will be positive and the 2003 tax break law positively impacted the savings
of households whose head belongs to the private sector. X ′it is a vector of household
characteristics. The household characteristics include a quadratic of the age of the
household head, education attainment, gender of the household head, family size,
number of jobs held by the head, marital status, occupation and state of residence.
νit constitutes an error term.
The causal interpretation of τ as the effect of the policy requires some iden-
tifying assumptions. First, the treatment and control groups’ savings rate follow a
common trend. The effect of time will be controlled for by the common coefficient
δ. Second, there are no other shocks in 2004 that affect public and private sector
workers differently, aside from the tax break. Finally, once we control for X ′it, there
is no selection into treatment. That is, workers with higher tastes for savings did
not change jobs across sectors and switched to the private sector to take advantage
28It is worth emphasizing that τ is intented to capture the overall effect of the policy and not
any structural parameter presented in equations (2.5) - (2.10).
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of the preferential tax treatment.29
I estimate equation (2.18) using median regression analysis. In the context
of this chapter, median regression may be preferred to the more common approach
based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for three reasons. First, results from median
regression are more robust to the presence of outliers than OLS. Median regression
is also a less arbitrary approach than dropping a given percent of observations
in the tails of the distribution and estimating the parameters with OLS using the
truncated sample (Koenker and Hallock [2000]). Second, the median performs better
than the mean as a measure of central tendency when the distribution of interest
is not normal.30 Finally, median regression has been used to analyze saving rates
in previous studies. Coronado (2002) used median regression to analyze the effect
of the Chilean pension reform on household savings. Poterba et al. (1995) also
focused on the median total assets of comparable groups to measure the impact of
tax deferred accounts on savings. Finally, Pence (2001) describes median regression
analysis as the “standard procedure” in the tax-deferred savings accounts literature.
I perform estimations of equation (2.18) for the entire sample as well as for
subgroups of the population based on age, income or marginal tax rate. The model
described in equations (2.5) through (2.10) illustrates how young and prime age
workers may be affected differentially by the availability of tax-deferred savings
accounts. Furthermore, previous studies find that different age cohorts have different
29Treatment and control groups could also have different levels of tastes for savings. This
difference does not impose an identification problem as long as the difference is time-invariant.
30This seems to be the case here. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of saving rates for the years
2000, 2002, and 2004. The distribution of savings rates is negatively skewed. Jarque Bera and
Shapiro-Francia normality tests rejected the null hypothesis of normality.
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savings functions (Gale and Scholz [1994]) and are expected to react differentially to
changes in pension wealth (Aguila [2008]). It is not clear a priori which age group
would experience a larger impact as a result of the policy change. For example,
if transition workers from older cohorts already decided by 2003 to receive future
pension benefits under the old regime (Marrufo [2001]), they could have become
inattentive to changes to the current pension system. This group of workers may
have not experienced a change in r (see section 2.4) and the estimated effect on the
savings rate (τ̂ in the equation (2.18)) would be close to zero. Additionally, prime
age workers may have not been affected by the policy change due to low levels
of financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell [2007]). There are reasons, however, to
expect the effect on the savings rate of prime age workers to be different from zero.
Given the proximity to retirement, the illiquidity of pension savings is a smaller issue
than for younger cohorts. In turn, the degree of substitutability between current
“non-pension” savings and pension savings is much higher and this potentially leads
to a higher response to the policy change. In regards to younger individuals, we could
expect a high impact of the policy because they may be more financially literate
and will contribute most of their working lives to the new system. On the other
hand, they may have scarce experience with the tax system and may not be aware
of the potential benefits of the law.
I estimate equation (2.18) for subsamples based on income. The estimations
that divide the sample by income groups use an income threshold equivalent to
five times the minimum wage. That is, households whose head earns less than
five times the minimum wage are considered low income households. Households
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whose head earns above this threshold are considered high income households. This
income threshold is motivated by the following fact. Levy (2008) suggests that
low income groups will be insensitive to changes in the pension system due to the
high probability that individuals in this group will fall back into the government’s
Minimum Guaranteed Pension. I explore this possibility by estimating the pension
wealth that workers could expect to obtain upon retirement.31 I estimate the pension
wealth a worker is entitled to receive under both pension regimes (before and after
1997) for several income levels. I find that workers earning less than five times
the minimum wage obtain a larger pension under the new regime. Moreover, given
the low estimated wealth accumulated in their MxIRA, the pension they receive
is actually the Minimum Guaranteed Pension. If low income workers realize that
they will receive the Guaranteed Pension and become inattentive to changes in the
pension system, the effect of the 2003 tax policy change may be zero.32 Estimation
for the high income subsample is also of interest as workers with higher incomes (and
higher marginal tax rates) face higher incentives to change their saving behavior,
holding other factors constant.
I also estimate Marginal Tax Rates (MTR) for workers in the sample based on
the income information provided in the data.33 I use subgroups based on the MTR
to estimate equation (2.18). I split the sample into workers who face a zero MTR
and workers with a positive MTR. Mexican workers with relatively low income are
31A similar exercise is performed in Aguila (2008). Details of the pension wealth calculation are
included in Appendix A.1.
32It is worth noting that my own calculations show a high overlap between low income workers
and workers facing a zero marginal tax rate. Given the nature of the policy, a large share of low
income workers would be expected not to be affected by the policy. See below.
33See Appendix A.2.
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given a “Crédito al Salario” (Salary credit) which can yield an effective MTR of
zero. Furthermore, the tax breaks of the MxIRA are non-refundable. Thus, workers
who face a zero MTR should not be affected by the policy, and the estimate τ̂ for
these workers should be statistically equal to zero.
Finally, I extend the analysis based on median regression and estimate quan-
tile regressions for other points of the savings distribution. The 2003 policy may
have had heterogeneous effects due to the individuals’ observable and unobservable
characteristics. The subgroups of workers described above allow to estimate the
heterogeneous effects based on observable characteristics. To explore heterogeneous
effects based on unobservable characteristics, I obtain regression estimates at dif-
ferent conditional quantiles of the outcome distribution (Buchinsky [1998]). These
estimates may provide a description of the effects induced by a policy change when
observably equivalent individuals have different unobservable preferences for saving.
From a policy perspective, the analysis of the distributional effects of the imple-
mentation of tax-deferred savings accounts is of special interest. Policy makers may
be concerned about the policy effects on the lower parts of the savings distribution
where workers are more likely to have low levels of retirement wealth (Chernozhukov
and Hansen [2004] and Levy [2008]).
Multiperiod effects
Data availability for other years, both before and after the 2003 policy change,
allows me to expand equation (2.18) to include additional time periods in the es-
42
timation. This expansion increases the statistical precision of the estimates of γ.
Moreover, the inclusion of additional time periods allows me to test for differences
in pre-policy trends between private and public sector workers’ savings rates and
for multiperiod effects of the policy. Thus, instead of having one interaction term
(Ii in equation (2.17)), the equation contains a set of interaction terms between the








τt · I(t · privatesec)it +X ′itγ + νit
(2.19)
where t = {2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006}. The year 2000 constitutes the omitted
category. The main coefficient of interest is τ2004. This is the policy effect estimate
for the year following the introduction of the MxIRA. If the effect of the policy had
spillovers on the relative savings rate of private sector workers in subsequent years,
τ2005 and τ2006 should be statistically different from zero. Equation (2.19) includes
the series of year dummies (T (t)it) and the vector of household characteristics (X
′
it).
νit constitutes an error term. Equation (2.19) is estimated using median regression
analysis.
2.6 Data
The analysis of household savings is based on the National Households’ Income
and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH). The ENIGH is a nationally representative survey
conducted every two years. It is a repeated cross section and contains detailed
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information on income, expenditures, household characteristics, and demographic
characteristics of all members. The information is collected mainly during November
and December, and refers to the three and six months prior to the survey month. The
data are standardized and presented for the last reference quarter. I use information
for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006.34 For each survey year, the ENIGH
contains information on households’ sampling weights. These weights account for
the sampling procedure followed to collect the survey and are used in calculations
to be representative at the country level. I define the household saving rate as
the difference between total income and total expenditures divided by total income.
Total income includes after tax labor income, business income, government transfers,
private transfers, and other income. I do not include the imputed value of rental
income. Total expenditures include expenditures on both durable and non-durable
goods. This saving measure has been used in other studies on household savings
behavior (Aportela [1999], Attanasio and Brugiavini [2003], Attanasio et al. [2004],
Aguila [2008]) and is a flow measure. The calculation of savings is based only on
monetary income and expenditures. The savings rate is calculated at the household
level. That is, I account for the income and expenditures of all household members.
Finally, I do not include in the estimations observations who have a savings rate
lower than -100% or over 100%.35
34The ENIGH is also available for the years 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998. Although it was
planned to be conducted every two years, a government surplus combined with a desire to have
income-expenditure data for the same year as the II Population Count made the ENIGH 2005
possible.
35The results do not change qualitatively when observations with savings rate below -100%
or above 100% are included. I also perform estimations including non-monetary income and
expenditures. The results closely follow the ones presented here.
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The survey also contains information about the pension institute to which
each worker contributes. Private sector workers contribute to the IMSS, whereas
public employees contribute to the ISSSTE. To classify households as private or
public contributors, I rely on the household head’s information. In the estimation,
I restrict the sample to include only workers who work for a salary, are Mexican
residents, either contribute to the IMSS and report having a pension account, or
contribute to the ISSSTE, and belong to the “transition generation”.36 Estimations
for the years 2002 and 2004 use a sample of 7,323 households (out of 39,392). The
estimations for long term effects use a sample of 17,433 households (out of 93,280)
across five years of data.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for sample households for the years
2000, 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006. Statistics for households headed by private sector
workers and public sector workers are presented separately. It is notable that public
employees have higher levels of income and expenditures in all years. Heads working
in the public sector tend to be older, better educated and are more likely to be
female. Other demographic characteristics do not seem to differ much between the
two groups. In the estimations I control for all these variables.
36Workers earning a salary or working for an hourly wage are included. Workers that do not
work for pay are excluded from the analysis. Omitting workers that did not contribute to IMSS
or ISSSTE is equivalent to dropping all informal workers from the sample. In the ENIGH, only
current contribution status to the IMSS or ISSSTE is available. The transition generation refers
to workers who had contributed to the pension system before the 1997 reform took place. In
principle, I would want to look at individuals who have been working since the 1997 reform and
continuously contributed to the system. Since only current contribution status is available, I must
assume this is the case despite the high mobility between the formal and informal sector of some




Table 2.3 presents results for the median regression estimation of equation
(2.18) using the ENIGH 2002 and 2004 data with the corresponding sampling
weights. The table is divided into three columns. Column [1] presents the re-
sults for the entire sample. Column [2] presents the results for the young workers
sample, i.e. households whose head is less than 40 years old. Column [3] presents
results including households whose head is at least 40 years old (prime age work-
ers). The estimation results presented in all columns include controls for the state of
residence, type of occupation and other demographic characteristics. The standard
errors used for inference in all regressions are calculated using bootstrap methods
(Koenker and Hallock [2000]).The bootstrapped standard errors reported in this
paper are obtained using 1,000 iterations.
For the complete sample (column [1]) there is evidence of an increase in the
savings rate after the implementation of the policy. The conditional median saving
rate of private sector workers is around 5.9 percentage points (pp) higher than that
of public employees in the year 2004. The difference is statistically significant at
the 5% level. Next, the sample is divided by age of the household head. The
estimates suggest that the policy change did not affect the sample of young workers.
After controlling for covariates (column [2]), the conditional median of private sector
workers is 1.8 pp higher than that of public sector workers but not statistically
significant. In contrast, prime age workers seem to have been affected by the policy
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change. The conditional median of the savings distribution of private sector prime
age workers in 2004 is 9.3 pp higher and statistically different from that of public
employees (column [3]). To put this result in perspective, the effect of the policy is
equivalent to one third of a standard deviation of the savings rate distribution.
Table 2.4 presents the median regression results of estimating equation (2.18)
and splitting the sample by MTR or income levels. It is clear that the effects
found for the complete sample are driven by workers who have a positive MTR
(column [2]). There is evidence of a statistically significant 6.6 pp difference in
the conditional median savings rate for private sector workers with a positive MTR.
The effect for workers with a MTR of zero (column [1]) is statistically insignificant.37
Similar results are found when we use subgroups of the workers population based
on income. For high income workers, the conditional median of the savings rate of
private sector workers is 8.6 pp higher than for high income public sector workers
(column [4]). The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. There is no
evidence that the conditional median of the savings rate distribution of low income
workers is statistically different between private and public sector workers.
The results from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 may raise the concern that there is signif-
icant overlap between, say, the prime age workers and the high income samples. To
37Given the incentive structure of the policy change, one could expect to find heterogeneous
effects that depend not only on whether the worker has a positive MTR, but also on the magnitude
of the MTR. Holding all things equal, workers facing a higher MTR may have higher incentives
to change their behavior as a result of the policy change. In results not shown here, I test this
hypothesis by estimating a modified version of equation (2.18) that includes a dummy (and the
corresponding time and private sector interactions) for each of three MTR groups: MTR greater
than zero and smaller than 10%, MTR greater than 10% and smaller than 20%, and MTR greater
than 20%. I find evidence that the higher the MTR the larger the estimated difference in the
conditional median between private and public sector workers. However, the coefficients are very
imprecise.
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address this concern I re-estimate equation (2.18) and allow for a differential effect
between low income and high income workers. I estimate a expanded version of
equation (2.18) that also includes as controls: a dummy variable taking the value
1 if the individual is a high income worker, an interaction of this variable with the
year 2004 dummy, an interaction of the high income dummy with the private sector
dummy, and a triple interaction between private sector, year 2004 and high income
dummies. Table 2.5 presents the results for this specification.38 Column [1] presents
the results for the entire sample. Columns [2] and [3] present the results for the
young and prime age workers samples, respectively. Column [1] confirms a result
found previously. The policy change seems to have affected the high income private
sector workers. The conditional median is 9.3 pp higher for high income private sec-
tor workers and statistically significant. There is no evidence that the policy change
affected low income workers. Also, there is no evidence that the policy change af-
fected low income young workers nor high income young workers. Finally, the effect
of prime age workers is driven by high income individuals. The conditional median
of the savings distribution of private sector workers is 13.3 pp higher than for that
of comparable public employees. The conditional median for low income prime age
workers is not statistically significant.
The results from Tables 2.3-2.5 suggest that the policy lead to a permanent
increase in the stock of wealth of private sector households, especially those headed
by prime age or high income workers. Assuming a comparable rate of return among
38Similar results are found if a dummy variable taking the value 1 for workers with positive
MTR is used instead of a high income dummy.
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all savings and investments, a back of the envelope calculation yields that a 40
year old individual with median income could expect an increase in her wealth
accumulated for retirement equivalent to $1500-$3600 USD. The estimate for a prime
age high income worker is between $2400-$5800 USD. On average, this amounts to
three months worth of salary income in 2004.
Next, I estimate equation (2.18) at quantiles other than the median. Given
that previous results clearly point at differential effects between young and prime
age individuals, I perform the quantile estimations for these subgroups separately.
Table 2.6 presents the results obtained for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th per-
centiles for the young workers sample. For most of the savings distribution the
policy change does not seem to have had an effect. Only private sector workers in
the 75th percentile appear to have been affected by the policy. Table 2.7 presents
the quantile regressions for the prime age workers sample. There is evidence of a
positive and decreasing effect of the policy change across the savings distribution
of prime age workers. For prime age workers the savings rate at the conditional
10th percentile of the savings distribution of private sector workers is 14 pp higher
than that for public employees. The difference for the 25th and 50th percentiles are
10.5 and 9.3, respectively. All differences are statistically significant at the 5% level.
This evidence suggests that the policy had a larger effect on the workers who are
relatively low savers.39 Finally, it is worth noting that the pattern of effects in the
39One may be concerned that the evidence found on the lower half of the savings distribution may
not reflect the policy effect on the low-savers group because quantile regressions cannot observe
the same group of workers across time. There are two facts that should lessen this concern. First,
low levels of income mobility in Mexico have been documented in previous studies (Antman and
McKenzie [2005]). Since income and savings are highly correlated, we should expect low mobility
of workers on the savings distribution across time. This implies that the higher post-policy savings
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quantile estimations is consistent with the pattern illustrated in model from section
(2.4). I find evidence of higher effects for young workers who are on the upper half
of the savings distribution and who probably high higher tastes for savings. Also,
I find evidence of a positive and decreasing policy effect along the savings distri-
bution of prime age workers. It is plausible that this empirical finding comes from
prime age workers saving up to a target. Hence, the closer they are to that target
at the time the tax breaks for retirement accounts are introduced, the smaller their
reaction to them.
2.7.2 Multiperiod effects
The results found in Tables 2.3 through 2.7 provide strong evidence that the
tax break policy had a positive effect on the savings rate of certain groups of the
private sector worker population in the year following the policy change. In the
absence of other changes to r, however, we could expect the effects of the policy on
savings rates to spillover to subsequent years. The availability of data for 2005 and
2006 allows me to expand the previous analysis and estimate equation (2.19).
Table 2.8 reports results from estimating equation (2.19) using median regres-
sion. Inference is based on bootstrapped standard errors using 1,000 replications.
For the complete sample (column [1]), the savings rate at the conditional median
rate found for the conditional percentiles in the lower half of the savings distribution refer to
workers who were relatively low savers before the policy change. A second fact that could lessen
the concern of the non-tractability in time of low-savers is the pattern of effects found in the
estimations. My results show a relative increase on the lower half and a non significant effect
on the upper half of the conditional savings distribution. These findings are only consistent with
an increase in the relative savings rate of pre-policy low-savers and independent of any changes
experienced by high-savers.
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of the savings distribution for private sector workers is 6.1 percentage points higher
than that of public employees in the year 2004. There is no evidence of a difference
in trends in the pre-policy period. The dummy for private sector workers in the base-
line year and the interaction term for the year 2002 are not statistically significant.
This result provides evidence that the savings effects from the 2003 tax law are not
affected by changes in pension wealth due to the 1997 Pension Reform. Also, the
positive shock to the savings rate in 2004 seems to be “transitory”. The interaction
terms for the years 2005 and 2006 are not statistically significant. Columns [3] and
[5] present the results for the specifications that include only high income or prime
age workers, respectively. The results replicate those found in the complete sample.
The estimated effects of the policy are statistically significant (at the 5% and 10%
level) the year following the policy change, whereas the interactions for subsequent
years and the years before the policy change are not statistically different from zero.
There is no evidence of an effect of the policy change on the savings rate of young
or low income private sector workers in the short or long term.
2.7.3 Matching estimators
Previous studies criticize the estimation of equations such as (2.18) because it
does not allow for τ to depend on X ′ and does not ensure the existence of suitable
comparison groups for the treated individuals (Blundell et al. [2004]). One way to
address both problems is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) by propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983], Dehejia and
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Wahba [1998, 1999], Heckman et al. [1998], Smith and Todd [2005]) adapted for the
case of difference-in-differences. In the present case, there are two sources of non-
randomness. One relates to the treatment status (private or public sector worker)
and the other relates to the relevant time period (pre or post-2003). Note that
this creates four groups of individuals: non-treated pre-policy, treated pre-policy,
non-treated post-policy, and treated post-policy. I define the latter group as the
“effectively treated” (EFT) group. The estimation of the ATT is done in four steps
(Dearden et al. [2001], Aguila [2008]). First, two propensity scores are estimated. I
use a probit model to construct two propensity scores Ppriv(X
′) and P2004(X ′), one
for each source of non randomness. Second, common support is imposed across the
four groups by removing treated (post-policy) units that have a propensity score
lower than the minimum or greater than the maximum of the non-treated (pre-
policy) units. Third, counterfactual outcomes are estimated for each individual
in the EFT group. I assign counterfactual outcomes by applying weights using
a Gaussian Kernel function, or by using a Epanechinikov Kernel function. The
“distance” between an individual in the EFT group and her potential matches in
each of the non-EFT groups is represented by the Euclidean distance with respect to
the two propensity scores (Blundell et al. [2004]). The Gaussian Kernel is defined as
K(u) = (1/
√
2π) exp[−u2/2] for all u. The Epanechinikov Kernel weight is defined
as K(u) = (3/4)(1− u2) for all |u| < 1 and 0 otherwise. The Epanechinikov Kernel
is estimated using two bandwidths (0.02 and 0.03). The final step is to estimate the
ATT as the difference between the average difference of the savings rate of private
sector workers after and before the policy change minus the average difference of
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the savings rate of public sector workers after and before the policy change.
I present Figures 2.2 and 2.3 to illustrate how the matching works on the
propensity score distribution of the four groups of individuals. Figure 2.2 presents
the density of the estimated propensity scores ( ˆPpriv(X ′) and ˆP2004(X ′)) before
matching. Figure 2.3 presents the density after matching based on the Epani-
chinikov kernel (bandwidth = 0.03). A comparison of the densities before and
after the matching provides some evidence that the propensity score matching did a
good job at finding comparable individuals for workers in the EFT group. Imposing
common support drops 4.25% of the observations.
Table 2.9 presents the ATT estimates for relevant subgroups of the population.
The ATT estimates using Gaussian Kernel weights are shown in the first row. The
second and third rows use the Epanechinikov Kernel function to create the coun-
terfactual outcomes. I use two bandwidths to test the robustness of the results.40
It is notable that the propensity score matching estimates for the complete sam-
ple, the high income workers sample and prime age workers sample replicate the
results found using median regression. There is a positive and significant ATT in
all three samples and the estimates are close in magnitude to the median regression
coefficients. Following column [1], private sector workers have a higher savings rate
(3.3-6.3 pp) than public sector workers. The relative savings rate of high income
private sector workers (column [3]) is between 6.7 and 9.4 percentage points higher
than the savings rate of comparable public employees. In column [5] we find that
40Silverman (1986) provides a rule of thumb to define the bandwidth. The rule is expected to
provide an optimal bandwidth when the distribution is unimodal, fairly symmetric and does not
have fat tails. Here I do not follow the proposed rule because the distribution of the propensity
score in my estimations does not seem to have such characteristics.
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prime age private sector workers have a savings rate between 4.7 and 10 percentage
points higher than that of prime age public employees. Only one result is not in
line with previous findings. The sample of young workers presents a positive and
marginally significant effect when the Epanechinikov kernel (bandwidth = 0.03) is
used. However, as this estimate is not robust across estimators, I am hesitant to
conclude much from it.
2.8 Discussion, interpretation and validity tests
In this chapter, I estimate the impact of Mexico’s introduction of a preferential
tax treatment on retirement savings in 2003. This law affected all private sector
workers by making voluntary contributions to their personal retirement accounts
tax-free. The results found here provide evidence of a positive impact of the tax
break on household saving. The impact is driven by prime age and high income
households. The estimated difference of the conditional median of the savings rate
distribution between private sector workers and public employees in the year after
the reform is between 4.9 and 9.3 percentage points for households whose head is 40
years old and over. The estimate for high income workers is around 8.6 percentage
points, whereas for prime age high income workers the estimate is 13.3 percentage
points. The estimates of the effect of the policy are equivalent to between one-
half and one-third of the standard deviation of the savings rate distribution. The
effects of the policy change on the savings rate of prime age workers seem to be
concentrated in the lower half of the distribution. The quantile regression results
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for the young and prime age samples are consistent with a consumption/savings
model where heterogeneity in preferences translates into heterogeneous effects of
the policy change.
The positive effect on savings of the 2003 tax break appears to be a one
time impact and is not reversed in the years following the change in policy.41 If
we use these results and assume a comparable rate of return among all savings and
investments, the temporary positive shock in the flow of savings implies a permanent
increase in the stock of wealth of private sector households, especially prime age and
high income households. A 40 year old individual with median income could expect
an increase in her wealth accumulated for retirement equivalent to three months
worth of salary income in 2004.
Some of the results in this paper differ from findings in other studies. In
particular, I find that tax incentives affected the saving behavior of high income
households but not that of lower income households. Other studies (Engen and
Gale [2000], Benjamin [2003], Chernozhukov and Hansen [2004]) have found that
tax deferred accounts affect the saving behavior of households in the lower tails of
the income distribution, whereas households in the upper tails only shuffle their
holdings among different types of saving vehicles. Although the non-refundable
nature of the tax incentives of 2003 in Mexico could account for the non-response of
41One could argue that the effect of lowering taxes on increasing savings could be taken as
evidence of Ricardian equivalence. However, Ricardian equivalence refers to changes in lump-sum
tax liabilities and not, as is the case here, changes in distortionary taxes. In addition, according to
Ricardian equivalence, individuals save all the “unspent” taxes to be able to pay future tax hikes.
The change in taxes of 2003 was permanent. For the equivalence to hold, we should observe a
permanent change in individuals’ savings rate. The pattern of results found in this paper does not
show evidence of this.
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low income households, it is notable that high income households were significantly
affected by the policy change. On the other hand, I find evidence of larger responses
of older workers (relative to younger cohorts) to tax incentives, which is consistent
with other studies (Aguila [2008], Gale and Scholz [1994]).
There are two data limitations to my study. First, there is a lack of information
in the ENIGH on household wealth or the value of assets. It has been noted in other
studies that some measure of wealth is necessary to evaluate the relationship between
pension wealth and savings (Gale [1998], Pence [2001]). For example, studies that
have focused on the accumulated balances in tax deferred savings accounts to assess
the effect of these accounts on savings may have produced biased estimates. The
problem is that this approach overlooks the potential crowding out of other types of
savings or increased household debt. The dependent variable used in my estimations
is not affected by this problem. The ENIGH allows me to estimate the overall savings
rate, defined as the difference between total income and total expenditures divided
by total income. If there was a shift in balances across different types of savings
vehicles or if debt was increased to increase the balance in the tax deferred savings
accounts, the wealth level of the household would be left unchanged. Moreover, the
measure of savings used here would also be unchanged.
The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) is the only survey for Mexico with
data on households’ assets and debts. After working with MxFLS, I found that
the large non-response rate for questions regarding self assessment of wealth and
the way these questions were asked prevent me from conducting a similar analysis
as the one presented here using the ENIGH. Tabulations of the data (see Tables
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2.10 and 2.11) show that less than 600 households (out of 8440) have useful wealth
information from which estimations similar to the ones presented in this chapter
can be performed. The sample size is substantially smaller when income or age
subgroups are defined. For example, for the year 2002 there are only 100 observations
of salaried workers earning more than five times the minimum wage with complete
information on value of assets owned. Besides the small sample size, there is another
potential concern of using the MxFLS. In this survey, questions on assets owned by
the household and their value are asked to all members of the household. In many
cases there are significant disparities between the answers provided by different
members. Also, it is not always clear that the respondents are referring to the
same asset when answering about its value. The MxFLS follows this same approach
to collect information on household debt. Unfortunately, this approach affects the
potential analysis of the data. An example of this concern is as follows. Tables
2.10 and 2.11 present the estimated change in net wealth for selected subgroups of
the population based on income and age, respectively. The samples include workers
with similar characteristics to the ones used in my estimations: they work for a
salary, are at least 20 years old, and contribute to either the IMSS or ISSSTE. The
net wealth is calculated using two sources for debt. The row Net wealth - Ind applies
the information provided individually about the debt levels of all members of the
household. The row Net wealth - HH uses information provided by the household
head. It is clear that using one measure versus the other could have important
effects on the conclusions derived from the analysis.
A second data limitation is that I cannot confirm that the finding of increased
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household savings is coming from an increase in pension wealth. To investigate
this possibility, I look at aggregate data. Figure 2.4 presents the ratio of the flow
of voluntary pension contributions to the flow of compulsory contributions for the
years 2000-2006. This series is disaggregated by AFORE. Figure 2.5 presents the
ratio of voluntary to compulsory contributions weighted by AFOREs market share.
The figures present evidence that the savings effects found previously may in fact
reflect an increase in the flow of voluntary contributions after the tax break policy
came into effect. The ratio of voluntary contributions to compulsory contributions
is 3% in the year 2002, and it increases to 12.2% in 2003. Furthermore, in line with
the findings presented here, the ratio is still higher in 2004 (5.7%) than in 2002
though the difference is smaller, and decreases in the following years.
There are also caveats with regards to the interpretation of the main results.
First, there is the possibility that compositional changes arising after the implemen-
tation of the policy may bias the estimates of treatment effects. For instance, some
public employees may have switched to the private sector after the introduction of
the 2003 tax breaks. One could argue that the costs of switching jobs may have
prevented this type of behavior. Nonetheless, I explore this possibility and use the
National Urban Employment Survey (ENEU). The ENEU is a rotating panel that
collects information on the interviewees’ job characteristics. Using the ENEU for the
years 2002-2004, I do not find evidence of an increase in switching between the pub-
lic and private sectors. This result cannot guarantee that the workers who switched
have higher tastes for savings than the median private sector worker. However, the
absence of an increased inflow of workers could help lessen this concern.
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Another potential concern about the interpretation of my results is that the
data suggest that the 2003 tax break reform helped to buffer a decrease in the
savings rate of private sector households rather than increasing savings per se. To
see this, I calculate the fitted values of the savings rate from equation (2.19) and plot
the median estimated savings rate for private and public sector workers. Figures
2.6 through 2.9 present these results for low income workers, young workers, high
income workers and prime age workers, respectively. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 present the
median of the fitted values for two groups that were not affected by the policy. The
estimated savings rate of private sector and public sector workers follow a common
trend in both the low-income and young groups. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 present the
fitted values for high income and prime age workers. It seems that the MxIRA
provided an alternative and attractive savings vehicle to private sector workers that
prevented the drop in the savings rate observed for public employees.42
The drop in the 2004 savings rate of prime age and high income public em-
ployees may raise the concern that the relative increase in savings among private
sector workers is not a policy-induced response. I have investigated this possibility
and have determined a number of reasons why the effect is unlikely to be spuri-
ous. First, the drop in savings is observed in all other subgroups of the working
population (private and public sector) and hints at a general drop in the Mexican
households’ savings rate. To be clear, a general drop in the households’ saving rate
would not represent a problem for the identification strategy in my analysis. Sec-
42This drop in the savings rate was hinted in some of the tables of results where the estimated
time effect for the year 2004 was negative, and statistically and economically significant.
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ond, the decrease in 2004 in the median savings rate of high-income and prime age
public employees does not appear to deviate systematically around the oscillating
trend observed for private and public workers in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
To probe the matter further, I examine the major price indexes in Mexico to see
if there are any striking patters around 2004. Figure 2.10(a) presents the evolution
of three price indexes in Mexico for the period of analysis: the CPI, the Food
Price Index (a major component of the CPI) and an index for the Minimum wage.
All indexes are normalized to the year 2005. During this period all three indices
are increasing, but they are doing so at different rates. I present Figures 2.10(b)
and 2.10(c) to compare the evolution of the different growth rates. Figure 2.10(b)
presents the percentage change of each of the indexes for each of the years included
in the estimations. Figure 2.10(c) presents the difference between the percentage
changes of the minimum wage and the percentage changes in the overall and food
price indexes. The minimum wage is increasing in real terms during the 2000-2002
period. The minimum wage drops in real value between 2002-2004, increases again
in 2005 and decreases slightly in 2006. This fluctuating trend in the real value of the
minimum wage mimics the households’ saving rate shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
One might be concerned that the evolution of food prices and minimum wages
cannot help explain the observed changes in savings rates across working sectors. For
instance, private sector workers may have different spending patterns than public
workers. I test this using ENIGH’s expenditure data. I find evidence that house-
holds’ food expenditure as a share of income is similar in magnitude across working
sectors and remains constant during the period of analysis. Another concern might
60
be that changes in the minimum wage may be less relevant for high income workers
or completely so for public employees because their salaries are typically set during
revisions of collective contracts. Fairris et al. (2008) show evidence that in Mex-
ico the minimum wage serves as a norm for wage setting throughout the economy
during the early 1990’s. If minimum wages continued to have this role during this
period of study, then changes in the minimum wage have the potential to affect
the behavior of both high income and public employees. While showing a causal
relationship between the evolution of real income and the savings rate is beyond the
scope of this chapter, the patterns shown in Figures 2.10 provide some suggestive
evidence that the observed pattern in savings rate between groups does not reflect
a specific shock to public sector workers.
Finally, for my results to be invalid, any shock that might have differentially
affected public and private sector workers in 2004 must have also affected only high
income and older cohorts of workers. In estimations not shown here, I test the
possibility of a differential decrease in the level of income of public sector workers
in 2004. I do not find any evidence of this. I have also extensively investigated the
institutional background and did not find changes in the pension system of public
employees, nor was there any other policy change that affected differentially public
and private sector workers.
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2.8.1 Why are there no multiperiod effects?
Standard savings models as the one defined in equations (2.5) - (2.10) would
predict that any effect on the savings rate due to the policy change should be
reflected in all subsequent years following the change. However, the findings in
Table 2.8 present evidence against this prediction. One possible explanation is
that the estimated effect reflects a “one-period” change in r unrelated to the 2003
policy change. In the model, the parameter r includes all variables that affect
the net returns to savings. Thus, any temporary shock that affects the returns or
fees of the MxIRA could be driving the effects found in this study. The following
evidence suggest this is not the case here. Figures 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 present
information on returns and fees for several AFOREs and show no evidence that
changes in AFOREs’ net return are driving my results. Figure 2.11 presents the
weighted average annual return of all AFOREs and the annual return for major
individual AFOREs during the period of study. There is no evidence of a one period
increase in the return in 2003 - 2004 that could have led to an increase in voluntary
contributions. Figure 2.12 shows the management fees charged by AFOREs on the
flow of contributions to the retirement accounts, whereas Figure 2.13 shows the fees
charged on the retirement account balance. If there was a significant temporary drop
in AFORE fees, contributions to retirement accounts could have been temporarily
affected. I find no evidence of a sharp change in the fees charged by the AFOREs
in the 2003-2004 period.
The absence of multiperiod effects on the relative savings of private sector
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workers is difficult to explain under a simple consumption/savings framework. For
many models where individuals have some preference for smoothing consumption,
we would not expect a one-time increase in the savings followed by a return to
the previous savings rate trend. Alternative frameworks that incorporate changes
in individuals’ expectations or perceptions may help explain the observed effects.
Suppose that workers expected the tax breaks to be temporal and to last for only one
or two years. Based on this belief, they may have temporarily changed their behavior
to take advantage of the breaks while they lasted (in the years 2003 and 2004) and
immediately go back to the savings rate trend (in 2005 onwards). However, this
behavior cannot explain the fact that in 2005, workers should have realized that the
tax breaks were still in effect and that could be applied for the year 2006 as well.
Acknowledging this fact should have potentially increased their savings rate in 2006.
Another possible explanation for the pattern of results may be related to the
perceptions of Mexican private sector workers regarding the benefits of the retire-
ment accounts. The literature has noted previously that advertising may play an
important role in the contribution levels to tax deferred savings accounts (Thaler
[1994], Bernheim [2002], Hrung [2004]). In Mexico, the number of radio and TV
spots paid by CONSAR increased from 2001 through 2004, but was reduced in 2005.
Although most of the spots were intended to provide general information about the
Mexican pension system, it is possible that the decreased salience of the MxIRA
and its tax benefits affected workers’ retirement saving behavior.
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2.9 Conclusion
The effectiveness of tax-deferred savings accounts in increasing savings is a
long debated issue for which a consensus has yet to be reached. I exploit an ex-
ogenous change in the Mexican Tax Law that provided tax-free retirement accounts
for all private sector workers. I find that the tax incentives of the policy effectively
increased the relative savings rate of high income workers and older workers, but
only for one period. I provide evidence that the temporary effect is a response to
the introduction of the policy and cannot be explained by changes in retirement
accounts’ returns, fees or workers’ income. The policy change did not affect the
saving behavior of low income and younger workers. The findings regarding the
differential effect of the policy change by income level are in opposition to previous
findings in the literature. This result may be due to the unique features of the
MxIRA compared to tax deferred accounts in other countries. On the one hand,
the tax-free nature of the MxIRA provides larger incentives to save than the retire-
ment accounts in other countries. On the other hand, the benefits of the MxIRA
are non-refundable. This may explain why I found no effects of the policy for low
income workers or for workers with a zero MTR.
Understanding the determinants of retirement savings decisions is a crucial
public policy issue. Given the limitations of standard models to account for the
observed behavior, it is important to complement the analysis by studying variables
not related to returns and fees that could potentially affect individuals’ financial
decisions. In chapter 3 in this dissertation I explore this line of research and test
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whether the framing of information affects retirement management decisions of Mex-
ican workers.
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Figure 2.1: Histograms of savings rate, by year
Notes: Histograms are plotted using the sampling weights corresponding to the respective
ENIGH year. A normal density line is superimposed. P values refer to the Shapiro-Francia
normality test. Source: Own calculations using ENIGH data.
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Figure 2.2: Density distributions of the unmatched sample, by propensity score
(a) Propensity score - Treatment (b) Propensity score - Time
Source: Author’s calculations using ENIGH data for the rounds 2002 and 2004. Treatment
individuals are workers from the private sector. Control individuals are workers from the public
sector.
Figure 2.3: Density distributions of the matched sample, by propensity score
(a) Propensity score - Treatment (b) Propensity score - Time
Source: Author’s calculations using ENIGH data for the rounds 2002 and 2004. Treatment
individuals are workers from the private sector. Control individuals are workers from the public
sector. Matching is performed using the Epanechinikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.03.
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Figure 2.4: Ratio of voluntary to compulsory contributions, by AFORE
Source: Own calculations using CONSAR data.
Figure 2.5: Ratio of voluntary to compulsory contributions, weighted average across
AFOREs, by year
Source: Own calculations using CONSAR data.
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Figure 2.6: Median fitted value of savings rate for low income workers, by working
sector
Source: Own calculations using the ENIGH 2000-2006. Low income workers include house-
hold heads who earn less than five times the minimum wage.
Figure 2.7: Median fitted value of savings rate for younger workers, by working
sector
Source: Own calculations using the ENIGH 2000-2006. Young workers include households
heads who are less than 40 years old.
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Figure 2.8: Median fitted value of savings rate for high income workers, by working
sector
Source: Own calculations using the ENIGH 2000-2006. High income workers include house-
hold heads who earn at least five times the minimum wage.
Figure 2.9: Median fitted value of savings rate for prime age workers, by working
sector
Source: Own calculations using the ENIGH 2000-2006. Prime age workers include household
heads who are 40 years old and over.
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Figure 2.10: Price indexes for Mexico
(a) By year (2005=100)
(b) Percentage changes over time
(c) Difference between changes in minimum wage and indexes, by year
Source: Author’s calculations using Banxico and SAT data.
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Figure 2.11: Annualized returns (%), by AFORE
Notes: Only AFOREs with the highest market shares are presented. “System” is the
weighted average return of all AFOREs. Source: Own calculations using CONSAR data.
Figure 2.12: Balance fee (%), by AFORE
Notes: Only AFOREs with the highest market shares are presented. Source: Own calcula-
tions using CONSAR data.
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Figure 2.13: Flow fee (%), by AFORE
Notes: Only AFOREs with the highest market shares are presented. “System” is the




















































Table 2.2: Summary statistics by year and employment sector
Source: Own calculations with ENIGH 2000-2006. Only salaried working household heads
who contribute to a pension system are included. Individuals living in households with a savings
rate below -100% or above 100% are excluded. Weighted averages and standard deviations (in
parenthesis) are shown. † Median is shown.
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Table 2.3: Median regression results. Dependent variable: household savings rate
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 repli-
cations are presented in parenthesis. All regressions include state of residence dummies, dummies
for occupation of the household head and other demographic characteristics. Column (2) includes
only households whose head is younger than 40. Column (3) includes household heads who are
40 years old or over. Data comes from ENIGH 2002 and 2004. Sample weights are used in all
estimations.
Table 2.4: Median regression results by income groups. Dependent variable: house-
hold savings rate
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 replica-
tions are presented in parenthesis. All regressions include state of residence dummies, dummies for
occupation of the household head and other demographic characteristics. Column (1) uses workers
with an estimated Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) of zero. Column (2) uses individuals with a positive
MTR. Column (3) uses individuals earning less than five times the minimum wage. Column (4)
includes workers who earn at least five times the minimum wage. Data comes from ENIGH rounds
2002 and 2004. Sample weights are used in all estimations.
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Table 2.5: Median regression results with income level interactions. Dependent
variable: household savings rate
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000
replications are presented in parenthesis. “High income” represents a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 if the individual earns more than five times the minimum wage. Regressions also include
state of residence dummies and type of occupation of the household head dummies. Demographic
characteristics of the household and the household’s head are included. Only individuals from the
transition generation and working in the formal sector are included. Column (1) does not impose
further restrictions. Column (2) only includes households whose head is younger than 40. Column
(3) includes households whose head is 40 years old or over. Data comes from ENIGH rounds 2002
and 2004. Sample weights are used in all estimations.
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Table 2.6: Quantile regressions results for young workers sample. Dependent vari-
able: household savings rate
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000
replications are presented in parenthesis. Observations with savings rate lower than -100% or
above 100% were not included. Only households whose head is less than 40 years old are included.
All regressions include state of residence dummies, dummies for occupation of the household head
and other demographic characteristics. Column’s head indicate the quantile estimated. Data
comes from ENIGH 2002 and 2004. Sample weights are used in all estimations.
Table 2.7: Quantile regressions results for prime age workers sample. Dependent
variable: household savings rate
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000
replications are presented in parenthesis. Observations with savings rate lower than -100% or
above 100% were not included. Only households whose head is 40 years old or over are included.
All regressions include state of residence dummies, dummies for occupation of the household head
and other demographic characteristics. Column’s head indicate the quantile estimated. Data
comes from ENIGH 2002 and 2004. Sample weights are used in all estimations.
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Table 2.8: Median regression results for multiperiod analysis. Dependent variable:
household savings rate
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000
replications are presented in parenthesis. Only individuals from the transition generation and
working in the formal sector are included. Observations with savings rate lower than -100% or
above 100% were not included. All regressions include state of residence dummies, dummies for
occupation of the household head and other demographic characteristics. Column (1) does not
impose further restrictions. Column (2) includes only households whose head earns less than five
times the minimum wage. Column (3) includes only high income households. Column (4) includes
households whose head is younger than 40. Column (5) includes household heads who are 40
years old or over. Data obtained from ENIGH rounds 2000-2006. Sample weights are used in all
estimations.
79
Table 2.9: Estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, by Propensity Score
Matching Procedure. Dependent variable: household savings rate
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 The Gaussian Kernel weight is defined as K(u) =
(1/
√
2π)exp[−u2/2] for all u. The Epanechinikov Kernel weight is defined as K(u) = (3/4)(1−u2)
for all |u| < 1 and 0 otherwise. Bootstrapped standard errors using 200 replications are presented
in parenthesis. For each private sector individual in the post-policy period, three matches are found
based on two propensity scores - one for time and one for treatment status. Propensity scores are
estimated by Probit models. Demographic characteristics of the household and the household head


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Information Framing and Retirement Management Decisions:
Evidence from a Field Study in Mexico
3.1 Introduction
In the past few years, the increase in the availability and sophistication of
financial products for savings and credit, and major changes in pension arrange-
ments have placed more responsibility on individuals for making decisions regarding
savings, investments and planning for retirement (OECD [2005]). This larger re-
sponsibility has raised concern about whether individuals are making ever complex
decisions optimally. The psychology and economics literature, for example, have
shown evidence that individuals tend to be affected by the frame under which infor-
mation is presented and to rely on rules of thumb to make choices that require costly
calculations. In turn, this type of behavior may put individuals at risk of making
suboptimal decisions in their use of financial products, leading to inadequate levels
of savings, overindebtedness, and unnecessary financial distress.1
Retirement management decisions have been largely studied in the behavioral
economics literature. There is significant evidence that inertia, hyperbolic discount-
ing, bounded rationality and self control problems can affect individuals’ levels of
retirement savings or contribution rates in retirement accounts (Carroll et al. [2009],
1See for example Ausubel (1999), Benartzi and Thaler (2002), or Choi et al. (2006).
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Thaler and Benartzi [2004]). In this chapter, I investigate whether particular types
of framing, based on menu effects and loss aversion, can be causally related to
retirement management decisions.
This chapter uses the context of the Mexican Pension System to test how
framing can affect workers’ retirement management decisions. Mexican workers are
required to contribute to a Defined Contribution pension system and choose a Pen-
sion Fund Administrator to manage their individual retirement account. Currently,
the Mexican pension funds market is highly concentrated and the Administrators
with higher market shares do not provide the highest net returns or charge the low-
est fees. Despite the financial costless nature of switching affiliation, workers switch
very seldom, and when they switch they often do not switch to an Administrator
with lower fees. One potential explanation for this behavior is that the channels
communicating the performance of Pension Fund Administrators are ineffective at
helping Mexican workers choose the Administrators that maximize their retirement
wealth.
I use data collected from a survey with an embedded experiment to test
whether providing information under a specific framing may lead workers to switch
Administrator affiliation. Surveyed workers are asked to analyze hypothetical cases
containing information on the returns and fees of Mexican Pension Fund Adminis-
trators. The cases feature randomly assigned frames based on the concepts of choice
avoidance and loss aversion. Choice avoidance relates to the lack of choice observed
in individuals when they face overwhelming amounts of information. When process-
ing the information becomes too psychologically costly, it triggers inaction on the
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part of the decision maker. Loss aversion describes how individuals experience a
disutility of larger magnitude following a perceived loss than the increase in utility
following a perceived gain of the same amount. These two types of frames are cross-
randomized across individuals. The randomization helps to provide causal estimates
of the effect of two concepts from behavioral economics on retirement decisions.
The Mexican Pension System provides an advantageous context to study re-
tirement management decisions. Choi et al. (2006) argue that in the U.S. the
decision to contribute to a retirement savings account is not simple. It involves
deciding whether to participate, deciding on an appropriate contribution rate and
on an appropriate asset allocation. In Mexico, a worker does not need to calculate
whether and how much money she will put into her retirement account to have a
choice about which Fund Manager she will choose. By focusing on a straightforward
choice and providing a simple way to compare across Fund Managers, the probability
of affecting the worker’s behavior should be high.
I find evidence that reducing the number of possible choices increases the
probability that individuals choose a Fund Administrator with a higher net return
or lower fees. A “loss aversion” framing increases the probability of choosing an
Administrator with higher net return. I also find evidence that higher levels of
financial literacy decrease the effects of framing on Fund Administrator choice.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 presents the
background of the Mexican Pension System. Section 3.2 includes a brief review
of literature on behavioral economics relevant to the present analysis. The field




The Mexican pension system is a defined contribution system based on in-
dividual retirement accounts. Retirement accounts are composed of a compulsory
contribution made by employers and the employee equivalent to a fixed percentage
of the worker’s wage, a government contribution, and voluntary contributions. Upon
retirement, the balance in this account is used to buy an annuity that effectively
becomes the worker’s pension.
Retirement accounts are managed by specialized financial institutions com-
monly called AFOREs. The AFOREs invest the workers’ contributions, deposit the
returns in the workers’ accounts, and charge fees for their services. Mexican workers
are required to choose an AFORE to manage their accounts. Currently, every four
months workers receive from this institution an individualized statement indicating
the contributions made to the worker’s account, the returns earned and the fees
charged during the period. The statement also includes a table showing a ranking
of AFOREs based on their net return. The net return is calculated as the difference
between the gross returns and the fees charged. The worker’s current affiliation is
highlighted (see Figure 3.1). The design of the ranking table is regulated by law
and is the same across all AFOREs. Workers can change their affiliation at any
moment by calling a toll-free number, going online or by going to the office of the
Fund Administrator of their choice.
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Despite the workers’ ability to choose their AFORE freely and the information
they receive, there is suggestive evidence that workers are not choosing the Admin-
istrator that will provide the highest possible pension wealth. For example, in the
last two years, three of the five AFOREs with the largest market shares have been
ranked in the lower half of the net returns distribution. In addition, workers rarely
switch AFORE (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton [2008]), and in over 25% of the cases
they affiliate to one with higher fees (Duarte and Hastings [2009]).
One explanation for the observed outcomes in the Mexican pension fund mar-
ket is that there are unobservable characteristics of certain AFOREs that attract
workers. For example, those who charge the highest fees may also be the ones
who provide better customer service or have a valuable brand name (Hortaçsu and
Syverson [2004]). Another explanation is that low levels of financial literacy prevent
workers from obtaining a correct comparison across AFOREs. I propose an alter-
native explanation. The information provided to Mexican workers in their AFORE
statements may fail to help them to actively compare AFOREs and choose affiliation
due to the way it is framed. The psychology and behavioral economics literature
have pointed out how the context and the framing of the situation matters for how
people make decisions (DellaVigna [2009]). In our context, the inaction of Mexican
workers at choosing AFOREs could be due to the abundance of available choices
or the presentation of potential returns as gains and not losses. First, the number
of AFOREs available to Mexican workers has been around 16 in the last couple of
years. If workers perceive the comparison of all possible choices as costly, they may
experience choice avoidance and will not change affiliation despite the possible gains
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in terms of expected retirement wealth. Second, Mexican workers receive a state-
ment from their AFORE containing a table that compares the returns, fees and net
returns of each AFORE. The worker can then use this table to estimate the potential
gains from being affiliated to each AFORE and, in principle, switch affiliation if he
so desires. I hypothesize that framing the differences across AFOREs as losses -and
not potential gains- would affect the probability that people actively choose their
Fund Administrator. I now turn to a brief review of the literature exploring these
issues.
3.3 A brief literature review
This chapter focuses on the analysis of two framing devices in the context of
retirement decisions. The first device is choice avoidance. In the behavioral eco-
nomics literature, the impact that the number of choices or some of their irrelevant
characteristics have on individual’s decisions are defined as menu effects (DellaVi-
gna [2009]). Choice avoidance, a form of menu effects, states that when individuals
face decisions that involve comparing several alternatives, they end up avoiding the
choice altogether. To the best of my knowledge, there are only a few studies of
choice avoidance in the context of retirement management decisions. Iyengar and
Jiang (2003) and Iyengar et al. (2003) conduct an analysis with a large dataset of
employees in the U.S. and find that a higher number of 401(k) investment choices
is negatively correlated with 401(k) participation rates. Other studies have ana-
lyzed choice avoidance in other contexts via field experiments. Iyengar and Lepper
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(2000) conduct a field experiment in a grocery store where potential customers were
randomly offered a menu of 24 or 6 jam choices for free tasting. They find that
sales are significantly higher when the set of possible choices is smaller. Bertrand
et al. (2010) analyze loan take up rates from invitations sent by a lender in South
Africa. The content of the letter including wording, images and interest rates were
randomized across recipients. The authors find that, holding other factors constant,
suggesting only one example on how the loan money can be spent significantly in-
creased take up rates with respect to suggesting four different examples on how to
use the money. Finally, there is a related literature in health economics studying
the relationship between the number of choices and individuals’ welfare. Abaluck
and Gruber (2009) and Lucarelli et al. (2009) provide evidence that reducing the
number of prescription drug plans for Medicare Part D beneficiaries would affect
elders’ behavior and could potentially raise welfare.
For many existing models with non-standard preferences, Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s (1979) seminal work on prospect theory is the intellectual foundation (DellaVi-
gna [2009]). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that individuals’ decision making
under uncertainty is characterized by reference dependence, diminishing sensitivity,
loss aversion and probability weighting. This implies that the individuals’ utility
function has changes in wealth or welfare as parameters and not final states, is
concave for wins and convex for losses, is steeper for losses, and assigns weights to
measure the impact of events on the desirability of prospects. Numerous laboratory
experiments have empirically tested reference dependence and loss aversion. The
implication of these characteristics is sometimes referred to as endowment effects
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(DellaVigna [2009]). For instance, Kahneman et al. (1990) recruit subjects who are
randomly assigned into two groups. One group is given coffee mugs and the other
group receives nothing. Standard theory suggests that subjects in the group with
mugs should present a willingness to sell the mug similar in magnitude to the will-
ingness to pay for the mug of individuals from the no-mug group. The authors find
evidence that subjects who were assigned a mug demand a much higher payment
for selling the mug they own, than the payment offered by subjects who do not own
it. Horowitz and McConnell (2002) survey several similar studies and find that the
median willingness to accept and willingness to pay gap is 2.6. Isoni et al. (2008)
find evidence of the endowment effect for lotteries with goods and money prizes.
There are other studies that found evidence of reference dependence and loss aver-
sion in non-experimental settings. For example, Genesove and Mayer (2001) argue
that for homeowners, the original purchase price is a clear reference point at the
time they decide to sell their house. To test loss aversion, the authors use Boston
condominiums sales data to predict listed selling prices. They find that units with
a predicted price below the original purchase price are listed with a higher price on
average, than comparable units with a predicted price above the original purchase
price.
In contrast to previous studies on endowment effects, the second focus of my
study is loss aversion as a framing device. I explore whether the perception of a loss
can have different effects on individuals’ decisions than the perception of potential
gains. Loss aversion as framing has been studied in other contexts. Ganzach and
Karsahi (1995) conduct a field experiment and partner with a credit card company to
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test loss aversion. Credit card customers receive a call from the company promoting
the use of the card. The transcript used by the caller to promote the card emphasizes
the benefits of using the card or the losses suffered by the customer by using cash
or checks. The authors find that the loss-framed message had a stronger impact
than the gain-framed message. The percentage of customers using the card under
the loss condition was double the percentage of customers using the card under the
gain condition.
In this chapter, I test whether reducing the set of choices or framing informa-
tion as losses have an effect on workers’ retirement management decisions. I aim
to get a causal effect of menu effects and loss aversion by randomly assigning the
frame of the information.
This research is most related to Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008). They
conduct a field study in Mexico to test whether financial literacy impacts worker’s
AFORE choice behavior. Around 700 interviewees are asked to recommend an
AFORE for a hypothetical worker based on a randomly assigned scenario. The
scenarios present the information in monetary levels (Mexican pesos) or percentage
terms. They find that financially illiterate workers focus more on fees when choosing
between investment funds when fees are presented in pesos.
My study contributes to the understanding of retirement management deci-
sions of workers in multiple novel ways. First, it will analyze the effect of a “forgone
earnings versus losses” framing. The increase in the worker’s pension wealth accu-
mulation (from switching to an AFORE with higher net returns) will be described
as either the potential gains from switching or as the money the worker is losing
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every period as a result of her current choice. This framing exploits the analysis of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where people tend to prefer avoiding losses than to
potentially acquiring gains.2 Second, I will evaluate the role of choice avoidance in
the AFORE affiliation. Other studies have found that workers with low financial
literacy levels do not seem to use information on fees or returns in their affiliation
decision (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton [2008]). One possible explanation for this
is that they may be overwhelmed by the amount of information presented in the
AFORE statement. In such a case, the worker may be discouraged to make the
effort to find the optimal choice and settle for an easy-to-find, but satisfactory one
(Iyengar and Lepper [2000]). In this chapter, I evaluate whether different amounts
of information affect the choices workers make. Finally, the chapter also explores
whether the effects of framing vary across and within individual investor character-
istics. Emphasis is placed on the role of financial literacy and the potential effects
of framing. I now describe the field study used to collect data.
3.4 Field experiment
I test whether the framing based on loss aversion and choice avoidance af-
fect the way individuals think about retirement management decisions through the
2In a study related to retirement decisions, Choi et al. (forthcoming) study whether providing
information about losses can affect workers’ behavior. They use a large dataset of employees and
find that those close to retirement were losing money by not fully exploiting the matching rate
of the employer in their 401(k) accounts and its no-penalty for early withdrawal rules. In some
cases, an employee could contribute to her 401(k), immediately withdraw the money, and increase
her money holdings up to 6% of the worker’s salary. They conduct an experiment where they
send letters to randomly selected employees with enough information to calculate their forgone
earnings. The authors examine whether teaching workers about these losses would induce them to
change their behavior and contribute up until the employer’s matching rate. The authors did not
find any significant effects on contribution rates.
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application of a survey with an embedded experiment. Subjects were recruited to
participate in the survey in public spaces around Mexico city and online. Only in-
dividuals who were working and contributing to a social security institution at the
time of the interview are included in the final sample. The survey contains questions
about the worker’s demographic and economic characteristics. I include questions
related to the individual’s AFORE affiliation and opinions on retirement and the
Mexican pension system. A set of three questions related to financial literacy are
presented next. These questions are included as a way to address the evidence
found in the literature that individuals with low levels of financial literacy tend to
make suboptimal financial decisions (Van Rooij et al [2007], Moore [2003], Campbell
[2006], Lusardi and Tufano [2008], Ponce et al. [2009], Stango and Zinman [2008],
Lusardi and Mitchell [2009] and Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton [2008]). Appendix A.3
contains a sample of the survey questions.
The final part of the survey embeds an experiment. The interviewee is pre-
sented with a series of scenarios regarding three hypothetical workers - Pedro, Pablo
and Mari. The scenarios consist of a short introduction with information of a hypo-
thetical worker, a table containing information about several AFORE choices ranked
by net returns, and a question. The introduction states the age of the hypothetical
worker (fixed to be within 5 years of the interviewee’s age) and his/her current affil-
iation. The table mimics the one shown in the AFORE statements Mexican workers
receive every four months. Finally, the respondent is asked to make a recommenda-
tion of AFORE affiliation for the hypothetical worker using the information shown.
The amount of information and the framing of the question for each scenario varies
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depending on the treatment of interest and is randomly assigned. There are two
sources of randomization. First, individuals are randomly assigned to receive cases
that refer to the potential gains of being affiliated to different AFOREs, or that
refer to the losses the hypothetical worker has bore due to her current affiliation.
The potential gains were described as follows: “It seems like (NAME) could have
accumulated more money in the previous period and have more money for her re-
tirement. If you could give (NAME) some advice, what would you recommend?”.
The losses frame states: “It seems like (NAME) lost money in the previous period
since she accumulated less than what she could have obtained for her retirement
savings. If you could give (NAME) some advice, what would you recommend?”.
Under all scenarios there are gains to switching AFOREs either to one with higher
net returns, higher returns, or lower fees. The second source of randomization is
the number of choices shown in the ranking table. To keep matters simple, I ran-
domly assigned scenarios to show either 14 or 6 AFORE options. An example of
the hypothetical case is presented in appendix A.4.
I use the answers to the hypothetical exercises as a proxy for the behavior that
individuals would follow had they received an AFORE statement with similar char-
acteristics. Using hypothetical cases is convenient because it allows me to control
for reference points such as current AFORE affiliation and the balance in the re-
tirement account across interviewees. However, I must assume that the interviewee
evaluates the hypothetical worker’s case by assigning her the same utility function
as her own. This assumption has been made implicitly in previous studies (Hastings
and Tejeda-Ashton [2008]). The lack of access to interviewees actual AFORE data
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before the the implementation of the study constrains me to leave this assumption
as a caveat.
The features of the Mexican Pension System provide an advantageous context
to study retirement management decisions. For instance, Choi et al. (2006) argue
that in the U.S. the decision to contribute in a retirement savings account is not
simple. Once the worker decides to participate in the employer’s 401(k) plan, she has
to decide an appropriate contribution rate and an appropriate asset allocation. The
authors test whether simplifying the choice set affects workers’ behavior and employ
a mechanism called Quick EnrollmentTM . They mail to newly hired workers a form
that invites the worker to participate in the company’s 401(k) plan. The form also
states that by enrolling, the worker will contribute a pre-determined percentage
of his salary to a pre-determined investment fund. The authors find that Quick
EnrollmentTM tripled participation rates among new employees three months after
hire. They argue that by decoupling the participation decision from the savings rate
and asset allocation decisions, the mechanism simplifies the savings plan decision
process leading to a higher participation. In Mexico, a worker does not need to
calculate whether and how much money she will put into her retirement account
to have a choice about which AFORE she will choose. By focusing on a limited
choice set and providing a simple way to compare across AFOREs, the probability
of affecting the worker’s behavior should increase.3
3Currently, the AFORE ranking table provides a simple way to compare across AFOREs. Before
2007, AFOREs had a complicated fee structure that involved flow fees, balance fees and discounts
for tenure in the AFORE. Today, AFOREs can only charge a balance fee and discounts for tenure
are transferable across AFOREs.
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3.5 Results
Subjects were invited to answer the survey in public spaces at different points
in Mexico City. Individuals who were not working at the time of the interview or
were not contributing to a social security institution were screened out. A total of
345 individuals agreed to complete our survey. Individuals who are younger than
20 or older than 60 were dropped from the sample.4 Individuals who declined to
answer the hypothetical exercises or had incomplete demographic information were
also not used in the estimations. The final sample consists of 292 individuals.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the sample. Just under half (48%)
of subjects are men and 50.3% are married. The average age in the sample is 37
years and the median (not shown in table) is 35. About 37% of the sample has a
monthly income of at least $10,000 pesos (around $833 USD), which is just under
six times the minimum wage for 2010. As a way of comparison, the Mexican 2010
Census yields the following statistics for the population of workers with an AFORE,
who are between 20 and 60 years old, and reside in Mexico City: 47.02% are men,
36.9% are married, they are 37 years old on average, and 22.62% report and income
above $10,000 pesos. As a result, the conclusions from this analysis may relate to a
proportionately richer sector of the workers population.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics of individuals’ characteristics by the num-
ber of financial literacy questions answered correctly. A few clear patterns are
found. Women tend to answer correctly a higher number of financial literacy ques-
4Sixty years is the minimum age at which workers can claim severance pay. In Mexico, the
majority of workers choose not to wait until the age of 65 when they are entitled to full pension
payments.
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tions. Men represent 65% of the group of interviewees who answered all financial
literacy questions incorrectly. Among the respondents who answered all financial
literacy questions correctly, only 48% are men. Young and high income individuals
answered more financial literacy question correctly. The average age among individ-
uals who answered all financial literacy questions incorrectly is 40, whereas for those
who answered all correctly the average is 30. Meanwhile, high income individuals
account for 9% of workers who did not answer any questions correctly, and 65% of
those who answered all of them correctly.
Table 3.3 presents the tests for balanced characteristics across the randomized
frames. There are no statistical significant differences between frames for most
of individuals’ characteristics, but for married status. This difference could raise
concern about potential biases in the econometric estimation. However, it is not
clear a priori on which direction the bias would be. To address this concern, I show
evidence that the inclusion of individuals’ characteristics as regressors do not affect
the estimates of framing on AFORE choice.
I begin by exploring whether some of the observed individuals’ characteristics
are correlated with the reasons behind workers’ AFORE choice, attitudes toward
retirement or estimated financial literacy. Table 3.4 presents the results of a series
of logit regressions for each of the possible answers the workers enunciated as reason
for choosing their AFORE. It is notable that almost none of the regressors are sta-
tistically significant. The dummy that accounts for whether the individual is high
income (i.e. he earns more than $10,000 MXP) is negatively correlated with the
probability that the individual’s family or friends recommended his current AFORE
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affiliation (column [2]). Being high income is positively correlated with the prob-
ability that the individual mentions “high returns” as a reason to choose AFORE
(column [10]). The other characteristic that seems to be significantly correlated
with some other choices is the level of financial literacy. Columns [7]-[8] and [13]-
[14] show that higher levels of financial literacy are negatively correlated with the
probability of choosing AFORE that is perceived as stable or because it provides
good service.
Table 3.5 presents the results of logit estimations that explore whether workers’
characteristics are significantly correlated with attitudes toward retirement or finan-
cial literacy. Older individuals tend to think more about their retirement and have
a lower probability of saying that they think they are saving enough for retirement
(columns [1]-[4]).5 It is notable that individuals with higher levels of financial liter-
acy have a lower probability of saying they think about their retirement frequently
or sometimes. Columns [5] through [7] present results of a logit regression where
the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual answered correctly each of the
financial literacy questions. High income people have a higher probability of answer-
ing the discount question correctly. Married individuals show a lower probability of
answering the other two questions correctly.
5The first question asks “How often do you think about retirement?”. If the individual answered
frequently or sometimes, the dependent variable is equal to one. The second refers to the following
statement: “I think I’m saving enough for my retirement”. The dependent variable is equal to 1
if the individual completely agrees or agrees with the sentence.
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3.5.1 Framing effects on retirement management decisions
The main objective of this chapter is to estimate whether framing informa-
tion affects individuals’ decision regarding AFORE affiliation. As a proxy for this
decision I ask surveyed individuals to make a recommendation regarding AFORE
affiliation for three hypothetical workers. The information for each hypothetical
worker was randomly assigned a frame based on choice avoidance and loss aversion.
For each hypothetical scenario, the recommended AFORE, its returns, fees, and net
returns were recorded. Given the randomization embedded in the field study, it is
straightforward to estimate the effect of the framing on the outcomes of interest.
The equation to be estimated is:
Yis =β0 + δ1I(ChoiceAv)is + δ2I(LossAv)is + δ3I(ChoiceAv ∗ LossAv)is
+ γX ′i + εis
(3.1)
Equation (3.1) is estimated for three separate dependent variables. Yis is a
binary variable that indicates whether individual i in hypothetical exercise s rec-
ommended a higher ranked AFORE, the highest ranked AFORE, or an AFORE
with lower fees. All scenarios explicitly mention the hypothetical worker’s current
AFORE affiliation. Thus, Yis is defined according to the current affiliation shown
in the scenario. Framing effects are captured by three regressors. First, a dummy
that is equal to one if the individual was shown a case with six AFORE options
(ChoiceAv). Second, a dummy that is equal to one if the case shown had a “loss”
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framing (LossAv). Third, a dummy that accounts for the interaction of both frames
(ChoiceAv ∗LossAv). The omitted category is the scenario that shows 14 AFORE
options and describes the hypothetical worker’s situation as having potential gains.
This scenario is closest in nature to the one provided actual AFORE statements.
Some specifications include individual’s characteristics as controls (X ′). εi is an
error term.
Table 3.6 presents the results from estimating equation 3.1 for the case of
recommending a higher ranked AFORE. Panel A shows the results from the logistic
regression. Following column [1], we find evidence that individuals who answered
hypothetical cases showing six options instead of 14 have a higher probability of
recommending a higher ranked AFORE. The estimate for the Choice Avoidance
indicator is statistically significant at the 5% level. The indicator for the “loss”
framing is not statistically significant at conventional levels. However, the estimation
of marginal effects (panel B) provides evidence that both menu effects and loss
aversion may affect individuals’ retirement decisions. Answering an exercise with a
smaller set of AFORE choices increases the probability of recommending a higher
ranked AFORE by 6.8 percentage points, whereas the loss aversion framing increases
it by 5.2 percentage points.
In column [2] I include individuals’ characteristics as regressors to control
for potential biases resulting from differences in subjects across treatment groups.
None of the individuals’ characteristics seem to significantly affect the probability of
choosing a higher ranked AFORE. Moreover, the estimates of the average marginal
effects for both frames do not change in magnitude or statistical significance.
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In the specification in column [3] I include as regressors the number of finan-
cial literacy questions answered correctly and the corresponding interactions with
the different framing treatments. This specification speaks to the financial literacy
literature and the observed tendency of financial illiterate individuals to make sub-
optimal financial decisions. I find evidence that higher levels of financial literacy
yield higher probabilities of choosing a higher ranked AFORE. The coefficient for the
number of financial literacy questions answered correctly is positive and statistically
significant (at the 10% level). I also find evidence that higher levels of financial liter-
acy are associated with smaller effects from framing. Following Panel B, answering
an exercise with a smaller set of AFORE choices increases the probability of choos-
ing a higher ranked AFORE by 13.8 percentage points among individuals who did
not answer correctly any of the financial literacy questions correctly. The choice
avoidance effect is smaller for the individuals who answered one (8.7 percentage
points) and two (3.8 percentage points) questions correctly. Finally, choice avoid-
ance does not seem to affect this probability among individuals with the highest
level of financial literacy. The loss aversion framing affects individuals who could
not answer any questions correctly (11.2 percentage points) or answered correctly
only one question (6.7 percentage points).
Table 3.7 presents results from a similar series of estimations but analyze the
probability of choosing the first ranked AFORE. The first ranked AFORE yields
the highest net return. This specification is intended to analyze whether individuals
follow the heuristic of choosing the best AFORE available.6 In principle, since the
6This could also be indirect evidence that individuals are able to interpret the information
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ranking table is the only information the interviewee can use to make a recommen-
dation, the highest ranked AFORE could be regarded as the best option. I find that
a reduced number of choices increases the probability of selecting the highest ranked
AFORE by 12.7 percentage points. It does not seem that, on average, showing a loss
framing significantly increases this probability. In line with previous findings, the
framing effects are heterogeneous across financial literacy levels. Following column
[3] in panel B, answering an exercise with only six AFORE choices increases the
probability of choosing a higher ranked AFORE by 23.4 percentage points among
individuals with the lowest financial literacy levels. The estimated marginal effect
is 15.6 and 8.3 for the individuals who answered one and two questions correctly,
respectively. Choice avoidance does not seem to affect the probability of choosing
the top ranked AFORE among individuals with the highest level of financial liter-
acy. The loss aversion framing only affects individuals who could not answer any
questions correctly (15.8 percentage points).
Table 3.8 shows results for the probability of selecting an AFORE with lower
fees. The probability that an individual chooses an AFORE with lower fees is higher
when individuals are shown a case with fewer AFORE options. On average, the
choice avoidance frame increases this probability by 6.8 percentage points, holding
other factors fixed (columns [1] and [2]). Allowing for differential marginal effects
across financial literacy levels, I find that the choice avoidance effect is larger for
individuals with lower levels of financial literacy and is not significant for individuals
who answered all financial literacy questions correctly. The “loss” framing does
presented in the AFORE statement, even when shown in percentage terms.
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not seem to affect the probability of choosing an AFORE with lower fees, but for
individuals with the two lowest level of financial literacy. The loss aversion framing
increases this probability by 9.6 and 5.6 percentage points among individuals who
answered correctly zero and one financial literacy question, respectively.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter aims to provide evidence on the relationship of behavioral eco-
nomics and retirement decisions. I conduct a field study that tests whether choice
avoidance or a form of loss aversion can affect workers’ decisions regarding pension
fund administrator affiliation. I obtain estimates of this relationship by using as
a proxy workers’ recommendations of AFORE choice based on hypothetical cases.
The information presented in these cases is randomly framed. I find evidence that
Mexican workers may be experiencing choice avoidance. Reducing the number of
possible choices increases the probability that individuals select an AFORE with
higher net returns or lower fees. Loss aversion affects only the probability of choos-
ing an AFORE with higher returns. Finally, framing effects are largest among
individuals with low levels of financial literacy.
One of the objectives of this field study is to explore the potential of behav-
ioral economics to nudge individuals into making decisions that may increase their
retirement wealth. This chapter presents evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the
current design in AFOREs statements may be triggering choice avoidance among
Mexican workers. Also, exploiting loss aversion has the potential to encourage work-
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ers to choose retirement fund managers providing higher net returns. This evidence
is based on a relatively small sample of workers, but given the strength of the find-
ings, future research is warranted to test if these results are robust to additional
samples and contexts.
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Figure 3.1: Sample of comparative table of AFOREs received in a worker’s statement
Notes: In the example, the worker is affiliated to AFORE 6.
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Table 3.1: Surveyed individuals’ characteristics
Source: Author’s calculations using data for 292 individuals. High income is a dummy equal
to one if the individual’s income is more than $10,000 MXP.
Table 3.2: Individuals’ characteristics, by number of correctly answered financial
literacy questions
Source: Author’s calculations using data for 292 individuals.
Table 3.3: Differences among individuals’ characteristics, by framing




























































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Logit regression results. Dependent variable: Choose higher ranked
AFORE
Source: Author’s calculations. The number of observations is 863 instead of 876 (=292*3)
because 13 hypothetical exercises were not answered. Standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level. Marginal effects in panel B are estimated from the logit results
shown in panel A. Standard errors in panel B are estimated using the delta method. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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Table 3.7: Logit regression results. Dependent variable: Choose the top ranked
AFORE
Source: Author’s calculations. The number of observations is 863 instead of 876 (=292*3)
because 13 hypothetical exercises were not answered. Standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level. Marginal effects in panel B are estimated from the logit results
shown in panel A. Standard errors in panel B are estimated using the delta method. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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Table 3.8: Logit regression results. Dependent variable: Choose AFORE with lower
fees
Source: Author’s calculations. The number of observations is 863 instead of 876 (=292*3)
because 13 hypothetical exercises were not answered. Standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level. Marginal effects in panel B are estimated from the logit results
shown in panel A. Standard errors in panel B are estimated using the delta method. ***p < 0.01,




A.1 Pension wealth estimation
I estimate the social security wealth of Mexican workers under two retirement
regimes. The first regime is based on the Social Security law of 1973 (PAYGO). The
second regime is based on the rules for the new pension system that began in 1997
(MxIRA). The calculations are similar to the procedure presented in Aguila (2008).
The PAYGO retirement wealth is based on the estimated monthly pension
the worker will receive at retirement. The IMSS 1973 provides tabulations of the
monthly pension a worker should receive according to her income level, years con-
tributed and age at retirement. This information is summarized in Figure A1. The
projected age of retirement is 65. However, workers can choose to retire and collect
severance payments as soon as they turn 60 years old. Under the PAYGO regime,
severance payments provide a replacement rate of 0.75 with respect to the retirement
payments a worker would have earned if retired by age 65. According to the IMSS
and other related studies, the regime is actuarially unfair after the age of 60 and
the vast majority of Mexican workers choose to retire early. The present value (at
the moment of retirement) of the social security wealth under the PAYGO system
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where APpaygo is the annual equivalent of the monthly pension the worker
will receive according to the 1973 law, T is the life expectancy, R is the year of
retirement, π is the inflation loss of the minimum wage, and ρ is the time discount
factor.
The 1997 regime retirement wealth is based on the balance accumulated on the
MxIRA account. Each worker makes a compulsory contribution to her retirement
account. This contribution is complemented by the employer and the government at
predetermined rates. On average, the contributions amount to 13% of the worker’s
salary. The accounts holding the worker’s contribution are invested and earn in-
terest. The AFOREs hold and invest these funds and charge a fee for this service.
The balance on the account at the point of retirement is calculated with a net an-
nual return of 8.023% on the MxIRA. This rate represents the average net annual
return recorded in the pension system from its creation until 2003. To calculate the
worker’s MxIRA balance at the moment of retirement, I calculate the contributions
made throughout the working life and account for the interest accrued every quar-
ter on the account. I assume that the worker’s pension is an annuity that depletes
her accumulated pension wealth exactly during her lifespan. This is equivalent to
assume that there is no cost to obtain an annuity. Finally, the annuities under the
1997 regime are price-indexed so there is no loss due to inflation. The equation to
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where APMxIRA is the annuity received by the worker according to her MxIRA
balance.
The calculations for both regimes use a common set of assumptions. All work-
ers have contributed exactly 25 years towards the social security system and are
entitled to receive benefits under any regime. Workers retire at the age of 60 when
they are entitled to severance benefits. A discount rate of 1% and an annual drop in
minimum wage value of 4.28% are used in the estimations. The drop of the real min-
imum wage is based on the average drop of value between the new pension system
was created and the year the tax break policy was implemented. Life expectancy is
set at 93 - the male life expectancy according to IMSS own estimations. The long
life expectancy is because a male worker’s benefits are transferable to his widow and
young children.
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) are estimated for several cases. The present value of
retirement wealth is calculated for a series of income levels (measured in multiples
of the minimum wage). For each income level, the present value of retirement
wealth is estimated according to the worker’s age in 1997 and the number of years
remaining until she turns 60. Table A.1 presents an abstract of the results.1 I find
evidence that workers who earn between 1 and 4 times the minimum wage get a
1The complete table is available from the author upon request.
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higher pension under the 1997 regime. Moreover, these workers fall back on the
government’s Guaranteed Pension. The amount of $276,040 is the present value of
retirement wealth with payouts equivalent to one CPI-indexed minimum wage.
I estimate the retirement wealth under both pension regimes with alternative
assumptions: a scenario with a net annual return on MxIRA of 4%; a higher discount
rate; and the set of assumptions followed by Aguila (2008) - a net MxIRA return of
8.56%, retirement at the age of 65, an annual drop in minimum wage value of 6.4%.
The result where low income workers fall back to the Guaranteed Pension is found
in all of them.
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Figure A.1: Pension received by earned wages according to the 1973 IMSS law, by
years of contribution
Source: Own calculations based on IMSS law.
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Table A.1: Estimated pension wealth under the 1973 (PAYGO) and 1997 (MxIRA)
pension regimes, by age in 1997 and income level
Source: Author’s calculations.
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A.2 Calculation of the Marginal Tax Rate
The marginal tax rate (MTR) for Mexican workers used in Table 2.4 is esti-
mated from the detailed information on the workers’ income recorded in the ENIGH.
Since this analysis focuses on private and public sector employees, only labor income
is included in the calculation of the MTR.2 The calculation was done following sev-
eral steps that I describe below.
First, I calculate the worker’s post-tax monthly income by components. The
ENIGH collects information on labor income by components. That is, the inter-
viewee is asked to differentiate between income coming from wages, overtime pay,
Christmas bonuses, vales de despensa3, gratifications, holiday bonuses, etc. Each
component is recorded quarterly and “post-tax”. To get a monthly estimate I divide
each component by three.
The next step is to estimate the worker’s pre-tax monthly income and corre-
sponding tax rate. To do this I incorporate three features of the Mexican tax code.
First, the taxes withheld in each worker’s paycheck depends on her income level and
on the ratio of taxable income to total income of the firm she works for. Each year,
the Mexican Treasury publishes a table of tax rates for each possible ratio (going
from 0.50 to 1.00). Each ratio tax table (RTT) presents income bins that define the
tax rate to be applied to the worker’s income. The second feature of the tax code
is that each component of labor income has a different taxable share. For example,
2Excluding households whose non-labor income represents a significant share of total household
income changes the sample size only negligibly.
3The vales are food vouchers given to workers that can be used as cash in stores to buy food
products specifically. They are not “food stamps” like in the U.S. in that workers with any income
level can receive them.
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wages are fully taxable, whereas Christmas bonuses are taxable only up to a certain
amount. In collaboration with an accountant in Mexico, I kept track of the taxable
shares of each labor income component recorded in the ENIGH. Lastly, I account
for social security taxes withholding. These taxes are paid by private and public
sector workers. Private sector workers are withheld an amount equivalent to around
2.4% of their salary. The withholding for public sector workers is around 8% of their
salary.
To estimate the worker’s pre-tax monthly income I follow an iterative process
using the Mexican Treasury tax rate data for each year included in the period of
analysis. I start by the lowest tax bracket in the RTT for the lowest ratio. I use the
corresponding tax rate to estimate what would be a worker’s pre-tax labor income
given her recorded amounts in each labor income component. The estimate of the
pre-tax labor income is then compared to the income bracket corresponding to the
tax rate applied. If the estimate is between the lower and upper bounds of the
bracket, the pre-tax labor income and tax rate is recorded. This calculation is then
performed for the next tax bracket in the same RTT. Once estimates are calculated
(and possibly recorded) for each tax bracket, the same process is repeated with the
following RTT. Almost always only one pre-tax labor income is recorded for each
RTT. The ENIGH does not provide information about the firms workers work for.
Thus, the final estimate of the worker’s monthly pre-tax labor income (tax rate) is
the average of the recorded pre-tax labor income (tax rate) estimates.
The estimated tax rate represents the tax rate that would be applied to the




This survey will take only a few minutes to complete. Please read the instructions for 
each question and mark your answer. If you would rather not answer a particular 
question, you can choose “Prefer not to answer”. Remember that our goal is to learn your 
opinions about the Pension System in Mexico. There are no wrong answers. THANK 
YOU FOR PARTICIPATING! 
 
1. Do you currently work?   Yes            No 
 
2. Do you contribute to a social security pension system (IMSS/ISSSTE)?  
  Yes            No 
 
3. Gender:          Male            Female 
 
4. What is your age? 
  I’m  _________________  years old.      Prefer not to answer 
 
5.  Are you currently …? 
  Single?      Married? 
  Other marital status?    Prefer not to answer 
 
Now, we would like to ask you about retirement savings 
 
6. Which of the following statements describes you better? 
 I think about my retirement savings frequently 
 I think about my retirement savings every now and then 
 I seldom think about my retirement savings. 
 I have never thought about saving for my retirement 
 I prefer not to answer 
 
7. For each statement, please mark the option that best describes your opinion. 
 Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
completely 
(a) I have enough 
information about the 
retirement system. 
     
(b) I understand what 
the investment options 
are in the AFOREs 
     
(c) I prefer to save for 
my retirement in my 
AFORE rather than in 
other vehicles. 
     
(d) I think I’m saving 
enough for my 
retirement. 





8. Do you know which AFORE you are currently registered in? 
   Yes, my AFORE is: ___________      No 
 
9. Which are the main reasons you chose (or stayed with) your current AFORE? 
Please select up to three answers. 
 Friend or relative recommended       Co-worker recommendation 
 My employer offers this AFORE   Lower fees 
 My bank accounts are in the same bank  Highest returns 
 I believe it’s the more stable AFORE  A large number of branches          
 It was assigned to me by CONSAR  Good service 
 Other: ______________    Prefer not to answer 
 
10. Have you ever switched AFOREs? 
   Yes    No     I don’t know   Prefer not to answer 
 
11. How long have you been with your current AFORE? 
 Less than a year     1 – 2 years   3-5 years 
 More than 5 years   I don’t know  Prefer not to answer 
 
12. Have you ever received an AFORE statement? 
 Yes     No     I don’t know  Prefer not to answer 
 
13. Approximately, in which of the following bins would you locate your monthly 
income? 
 $0 - $2000 pesos   $6001 - $8000 pesos   $15001 - $25000 
 $2001 - $4000 pesos  $8001 - $10000 pesos  More than $25000 
 $4001 - $6000 pesos  $10001 - $15000 pesos  Prefer not to answer 
 
 
Now, we would like to ask you some questions about some situations commonly faced by 
people. Please answer them to the best of your knowledge. If you believe you do not 
know the answer, or if you prefer not to answer select the corresponding option. 
 
14. In a supermarket, product A typically costs $700 and product B typically costs 
$1000. If today product B is being offered with a 30% discount, which of the two 
products is cheaper? 
  Product A 
  Product B 
  They cost the same 
  I don’t know 
  Prefer not to answer 
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15. Say that you have a savings account with $1000 pesos. The bank in which you 
have your account gives you an annual rate of return of 10%. If you don’t make any 
deposits or withdrawals for five years, how much would you say the balance in your 
account be at the end of these 5 years? 
  Exactly $1500 pesos    More than $1500 pesos 
  Less than $1500 pesos     I don’t know 
  Prefer not to answer  
 
16. Say that you have a credit card from which you owe $2000 pesos. The bank 
charges you a monthly interest rate of 1%. If you decide to pay the minimum payment of 
$20 every month, how many years will it take to get rid of your debt? 
  Less than 5 years     Between 5 and 10 years 
  Between 10 and 15 years    Never, I will always be in debt 
  I don’t know     Prefer not to answer 
 
 
[PRESENT HYPOTHETICAL CASE] 
 
17. In scenario 1, I would recommend:  
 He stays in his current AFORE   He switches AFORE to: ______________ 
 
18. In scenario 2, I would recommend:  
 He stays in his current AFORE   He switches AFORE to: ______________ 
 
19. In scenario 3, I would recommend:  
 He stays in his current AFORE   He switches AFORE to: ______________ 
 
 
20. Would you be willing to be re-contacted by our team regarding this research 
project? 










SAMPLE SURVEY – SPANISH VERSION 
La encuesta le quitará unos pocos minutos de su tiempo. Si prefiere no contestar alguna 
pregunta en particular, puede indicar “Prefiero no contestar”. Recuerde que nuestro 
objetivo es conocer más sobre su opinión del sistema de ahorro para el retiro en México. 
No hay respuestas incorrectas. ¡GRACIAS POR SU PARTICIPACIÓN! 
 
1. ¿Trabaja actualmente?   Sí            No 
 
2. ¿Contribuye actualmente a algún sistema de seguro social (IMSS/ISSSTE)?  
  Sí            No 
 
3. Género:          Masculino            Femenino 
 
4. ¿Cuántos años cumplidos tiene? 
   _________________  años.      Prefiero no contestar 
 
5. ¿Actualmente..…? 
  es soltero?      es casado? 
  tiene otro estado civil?    Prefiero no contestar 
 
Ahora, nos gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre el ahorro para el retiro. 
 
6. ¿Cuál de las siguientes oraciones diría usted que lo describe mejor? Lea las 
opciones y marque la indicada 
 Pienso en mi ahorro para el retiro frecuentemente 
 Pienso en mi ahorro para el retiro a veces 
 Muy de vez en cuando pienso en mi ahorro para el retiro 
 Nunca he pensado en mi ahorro para el retiro 
 Prefiero no contestar 
 










(a) Tengo suficiente 
información sobre el 
sistema del ahorro para el 
retiro. 
     
(b) Entiendo bien cuáles 
son las opciones de 
inversion de las AFOREs. 
     
(c) Prefiero ahorra para 
mi retiro en mi AFORE 
que fuera de ella. 
     
(d) Considero que estoy 
ahorrando lo suficiente 
para mi retiro. 
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8. ¿Conoce usted en qué AFORE está registrado? 
   Sí, mi AFORE es: ___________      No 
 
9. ¿Cuáles fueron las principales razones por la que usted eligió (o se mantuo en) su 
AFORE actual? Puede seleccionar hasta tres opciones. 
 Recomendado por familiar/amigo     Recomendado por compañero de trabajo 
 Mi empleador ofrece esa AFORE   Las comisiones son bajas 
 Tengo otras cuentas en el mismo banco  Me da el mayor rendimiento 
 Confío en la estabilidad de la AFORE  Mayor accesibilidad a sucursales   
 Me la asignó la CONSAR    Buen servicio 
 Otra: ______________    Prefiero no contestar 
 
10. ¿Ha cambiado usted alguna vez de AFORE? 
   Sí    No     No se    Prefiero no contestar 
 
11. ¿Por cuánto tiempo ha permanecido con su AFORE actual? 
 Menos de 1 año     1 – 2 años   3-5 años 
 Más de 5 años   No se   Prefiero no contestar 
 
12. ¿Ha recibido alguna vez un estado de cuenta de su AFORE? 
 Sí    No     No se  Prefiero no contestar 
 
13. Aproximadamente, ¿en cuáles de las siguientes catergorías ubicaría su salario 
mensual? 
 $0 - $2000 pesos   $6001 - $8000 pesos   $15001 - $25000 
 $2001 - $4000 pesos  $8001 - $10000 pesos  Más de $25000 
 $4001 - $6000 pesos  $10001 - $15000 pesos  Prefiero no contestar 
 
 
Ahora quisiéramos hacerle unas preguntas basadas en algunas situaciones a las que las 
personas se enfrentan en la vida cotidiana. Por favor respóndalas de acuerdo a lo que 
considere correcto, no es necesario consultar otras fuentes. Si considera que no conoce la 
respuesta, o prefiere no contestar escoja la opción que corresponde. 
 
14. En un supermercado el producto A vale $700 y el producto B vale $1000. Si al 
producto B le hacen un descuento del 30%, ¿cuál de los dos productos es más barato? 
  Producto A   Producto B    Cuestan lo mismo 





15. Imagine que usted tiene una cuenta de ahorros con $1000 pesos y que la tasa de 
interés anual es del 10%. Si usted dejara crecer su dinero y no realizara ningún retiro, 
¿cuánto cree usted que tendrá en su cuenta al cabo de 5 años? 
  Exactamente $1500 pesos    Más de $1500 pesos 
  Menos de $1500 pesos     No se 
  Prefiero no contestar 
 
16. Suponga que usted debe $2000 pesos en su tarjeta de crédito. El banco calcula los 
intereses mensualmente y su tasa de interés es de 1% mensual. Si usted paga el pago 
mínimo de $20 cada mes y no le carga más a su tarjeta de crédito, ¿en cuántos años 
calcula usted que terminará de pagar su deuda? 
  Menos de 5 años     Entre 5 y 10 años 
  Entre 10 y 15 años     Nunca, siempre estaré en deuda 





[PRESENTE LOS CASOS HIPOTÉTICOS] 
 
17. Yo le recomendaría en el caso 1 que:  
 Se quede en su AFORE   Cambie su AFORE a: ______________ 
 
18. Yo le recomendaría en el caso 2 que: 
 Se quede en su AFORE   Cambie su AFORE a: ______________ 
 
19. Yo le recomendaría en el caso 1 que: 
 Se quede en su AFORE   Cambie su AFORE a: ______________ 
 
 
20. Finalmente, nos gustaría contactarlo de nuevo para comentarle sobre los 
resultados del proyecto. ¿Estaría de acuerdo en que lo contactáramos de nuevo? 
























Mari is a worker who has saved $10,000 in her AFORE. As of today, Mari 
is 56 years old and is currently affiliated to AFORE XXI. With 










It seems like Mari lost money in the previous period since she 
accumulated less than what she could have obtained for her retirement 







           I would recommend that she stays in her current AFORE 
           I would recommend that she switched to AFORE: ___________ 
 
AFORE RETURN FEES NET RETURN
Azteca 9.49% 1.81% 7.68%
Profuturo GNP 8.14% 1.81% 6.33%
Invercap 7.96% 1.78% 6.18%
Banorte Generali 7.56% 1.38% 6.18%
ING 7.78% 1.62% 6.16%
XXI 7.80% 1.80% 6.00%
SB 1 for people 56 years old or more
NET RETURN INDEX
RETURN - FEES = NET RETURN
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